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l)THE ROLE OF ANALYST CONFERENCE CALLS IN CAPITAL MARKETS
Many firms conduct a conference call with analysts shortly after the quarterly earnings
announcement. In these calls, management discusses the completed quarter, and analysts
may ask questions. Due to SEC requirements, conference calls in the United States are
virtually always live webcasted. A growing number of investors listens in on conference
calls, suggesting that calls are useful for investor decision-making.
This research sheds more light on the role of conference calls in capital markets by
analysing a large sample of conference call transcripts, analyst forecasts, and
contemporaneous stock market reactions. The study investigates why conference calls are
useful. The analysis shows that managers who provide little information in their
presentation are actively probed by analysts. Hence, the interactivity of the call enriches
the information environment. In a second study, evidence is presented that information
about intangible assets is one of the items in conference calls that moves stock markets.
This study also shows that managers use the conference call to learn about the
information needs of analysts with respect to intangible assets. A third study suggests
that sell-side analysts do not voice their true beliefs on conference calls in an attempt to
favour their buy-side clients.
Collectively, these results provide evidence that conference calls with analysts enrich
the information environment, but their usefulness may be restricted by analyst incentives.
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Preface
Like many dissertations, this dissertation has a long history. I started thinking about doing
a PhD just after I completed my MscBA in 1997. My master thesis, titled “Balancing –
Collaging - Changing”, was a philosophical quest into accounting as a (socially
constructed) representation of reality. What is the role of accounting in a world where
reality is a social construction, rather than a positive fact? Which philosophers and
postmodern writers could teach us something about this question? What would become the
state of financial accounting if reality would become less and less singular, and people
would become more cynical about the realities that are presented to them? What should
change in accounting, in order for it to better appreciate differences1? These profound
questions would warrant further research and offered plenty of perspectives to write a
doctoral dissertation on.
However, before continuing my philosophical quest, I thought that a “few years” in
practice “wouldn’t hurt” and I started a job at PricewaterhouseCoopers. Twelve and a half
years later, I have become an accountant, focusing on the debits and credits of financial
reporting and valuation. Things do not get much less philosophical (and less sexy) than
that. Moreover, by 2005, my interest in research had revived, but after another few years of
philosophical wanderings, I had finally decided that empirical capital market research
based on archival data, was the best path towards successful completion of a PhD; a path
that almost diametrically faced my earlier research efforts. Today, after completing the
empirical capital market research in this dissertation, it looks like I have arrived at a very
different destination from the one that I envisaged when I started thinking about the PhD
back in 1997. However, although my research and professional life took a very different
path from what I had envisaged, the change in focus does not feel like a watershed. In fact,
in the spirit of my earlier research, appreciating differences means that you are able to
allow that there are multiple realities, and explore them, even when they are irreconcilable.
I have taken great joy in doing the research in this dissertation and I have learnt a lot from
exploring its possibilities. My choice to focus on empirical capital market research meant
1 Diversity was not yet in vogue at the time. Today this question has gained more momentum and I believe there
are many interesting research opportunities to consider.
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that I had to do a number of statistics, econometrics, and capital market research courses. I
have learnt a lot from these courses, and I still use the skills I have learnt in many
situations. Doing the research also made me look at things from different perspectives.
Particularly the capital market and analyst perspective on financial accounting were very
different from what I was used to. In my everyday work, I often benefit from this ability to
look through different eyes. In other words, I have truly developed myself by taking this
new path, and I believe it has made me a better academic.
At the same time, the fact that I have been in profession this long, reflects the pleasure I
get out of working with real people on real problems, whatever “real” may mean. Although
from a philosophical perspective the interactions may seem shallow and from an academic
perspective the problems may seem trivial, there is no substitute for fun, laughter,
friendship, stress, despair, anger, disappointment, astonishment, and victory. I only
intended to be in profession for a few years, but I have come to understand that there is no
substitute for the real, and I have learnt that I like to be in the middle of it. I am glad
PricewaterhouseCoopers allows me to.
As a part-time PhD student, the odds of successful completion are against you, and there
have been occasions when I was not confident I would succeed. Quitting has, however,
never entered my mind. I owe this to the continuous support and advice from my
supervisors, Gerard Mertens and Leo van der Tas. Even when I had little focus or was
showing little progress, they consistently gave me support and good advice. They have
consistently expressed their belief in successful completion. I thank them for that.
My parents have also continuously motivated me, though by quite different means. They
never missed an opportunity to ask whether my PhD was completed. The tenacity of this
question, asked without any self-interest, is excellent fuel for PhD research. I knew that,
with enough perseverance, I would eventually be able to confirmatively answer the
question, and get it out of the way for ever. Their contribution has, however, been much
bigger than just asking this question. I thank them for their support, concern and the pride
they take in me.
The best decision I took in the entire PhD process was to start cooperating with co-authors.
Originally this was inspired by the need for specific data, but I soon discovered that the
cooperation with seasoned co-authors not only helped to stay motivated, but also resulted
in much better research. Without the help from Dawn Matsumoto, Maarten Pronk, and
Frank Verbeeten, this dissertation would have been of much lower quality then it is now.
In fact, I guess it would not even have been finished by now.
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The dissertation would also not have been finished without the generous support of
PricewaterhouseCoopers. The firm allowed me to spend part of my time on research, and
many people took great effort in ensuring that I was actually able to do so. At different
times in my career, Leandro van Dam, Wim Holterman, Jack de Kreij, Peter van Mierlo,
Wim Schoonderbeek, Alexander Spek, and Robert Swaak, stood up for me, and I thank
them for their support. I am also grateful to the group of PhD candidates at
PricewaterhouseCoopers that participated in the PhD peer group sessions. Olof Bik, Arjan
Brouwer, Jose Hernandez, and Ewout Naarding offered a welcome sounding board, both in
terms of content and practical struggles.
The capital market courses offered by the Limperg Institute have been instrumental in
developing myself into a better empirical researcher. I am fortunate and grateful that Jan
Bouwens invited me to these courses; the sessions with Peter Easton were amongst the
most valuable and inspiring courses I ever attended. I also remember the many discussions
with the other participants, and I am always happy to meet them at conferences and see
that they have become excellent researchers. Stephan Hollander is one of them. I am proud
to have a paper with him (and Maarten Pronk) on conference calls that is much related to
this dissertation.
I realise that the completion of this dissertation has been a self-seeking endeavour, and I
thank Marian, Carmel and Emily for enduring it. I have spent lots of time on it that I did
not spend with them. We had holidays with my laptop running programs in a corner of a
hotel room, and we had many sunny summer days that were fully spend on getting a
regression to work. Marian had to endure it all, but she never complained one minute about
it. I thank her for her patience, her understanding, and I thank her for her love.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The use of analyst calls
This research examines conference calls that are conducted to inform the investor
community about the financial performance of the firm. Over the past decade, conference
calls have emerged as an important channel for investor communication. Among firms that
hold meetings with the investment community, virtually all conduct quarterly conference
calls. These conference calls are also known as "analyst calls" or "earnings conference
calls." Most public companies hold four calls per year, usually two-to-five weeks after the
completion of a quarter. Individual investors and the media are notified of upcoming
conference calls by news releases and notices on the corporate website. The conference
call is then conducted shortly after the release of the earnings announcement, typically
within three to four hours. Almost all conference calls follow the same structure. A typical
call opens with management welcoming everybody, followed by the CEO and CFO
commenting on the company’s performance and future prospects. The next part of the call
is the discussion portion in which the floor is opened for questions from analysts.
Today, virtually all calls are open to individual investors and the media. On 15 August
2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted the new rule “Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading”, referred to as “Regulation Fair Disclosure” or
"Regulation FD". The new rule became effective on 23 October 2000 and was adopted to
combat selective disclosure. Selective disclosure occurs when issuers release material non-
public information about a company to selected persons, such as securities analysts or
institutional investors, before disclosing the information to the general public. The SEC
believed that the practice of selective disclosure lead to a loss of investor confidence in the
integrity of capital markets.
Regulation FD requires that when an issuer intentionally discloses material information, it
does so publicly and not selectively. The company may make the required disclosure by
filing the information with the Commission (on a “Form 8-K”, a very broad form used to
notify investors of any material unscheduled event that is important to shareholders or the
SEC), or by another method intended to reach the public on a broad, non-exclusionary
basis, such as a press release. When selective disclosure of material information is made
unintentionally, the company must publicly disclose the information promptly thereafter.
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Since Regulation Fair Disclosure requires firms to make material disclosures broadly
available, firms that previously restricted access to conference calls to selected financial
analysts and institutional investors must allow unlimited access to their calls since 23
October 2000. Reasons to issue Regulation Fair Disclosure included concerns of the SEC
that in the absence of a prohibition on selective disclosure, analysts may feel pressured to
report favourably about a company or otherwise slant their analysis in order to have
continued access to selectively disclosed information. The SEC was concerned by reports
that analysts who publish negative views of a firm are sometimes excluded by that firm
from calls and meetings to which other analysts are invited (SEC, 2000a).
At the same time, several companies offered webcasting technology and services that made
it more practical and more affordable for companies to allow all investors to listen in on
conference calls. Additionally, several transcription services offered services to provide
draft transcripts soon after the call followed by an editorially reviewed final transcript.
Following Regulation FD, most companies now webcast their conference calls. According
to a wire service representative, between 1 October 2000 and 23 April 2001, the number of
corporate webcasts on its service nearly quadrupled from the same period 12 months
earlier (SEC, 2001).
The SEC considered that acceptable methods of public disclosure for purposes of
Regulation FD include announcements made through conference calls that interested
members of the public may attend or listen to. The SEC suggests, but does not require, the
following model for making a planned disclosure of material information, such as a
scheduled earnings release (SEC, 2000a):
x First, issue a press release, distributed through regular channels, containing the
information;
x Second, provide adequate notice, by a press release and/or website posting, of a
scheduled conference call to discuss the announced results, giving investors both the
time and date of the conference call and instructions on how to access the call; and
x Third, hold the conference call in an open manner, permitting investors to listen in
either by telephonic means or through Internet webcasting.
Companies are not required to furnish an additional 8K if the conference call is
complementary to a written earnings announcement for which an 8K was furnished and the
conference call is conducted within 48 hours after this release. Conference calls, therefore,
rarely occur later than 48 hours after the earnings announcement. As a result, the analysis
of the effects of conference calls should always be analysed in conjunction with the effect
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of the corresponding earnings announcement (i.e. the analysis of the effect of conference
calls should control for the effect of the earnings announcement).
Individual investors are usually not allowed to ask questions during a conference call. This
is restricted to analysts, the primary targeted audience of the calls. Since the conference
call is interactive, analysts can use the ability to ask questions to gain information that is
relevant to their objectives. The broader access to calls following Regulation Fair
Disclosure also allowed unsophisticated individual investors to listen to the conference
call. In spite of fears that these unsophisticated investors would misinterpret the
information that is provided during the call — and volatility would increase — managers
did not reduce the information content of conference calls (Bushee, Matsumoto and Miller,
2002).
Conference calls can be viewed as a response to the declining relevance of financial
statement information. There are many aspects of the firm that can have a major effect on
the value of its shares, yet that cannot be assessed adequately by reading traditional
corporate financial statements or even the footnotes and commentary that accompany them
(Brennan and Tamarowski, 2000). One way in which firms respond to the inadequacy of
financial statements is by conducting quarterly conference calls. Tasker (1998) analyses a
small sample of conference calls held by firms in high-tech industries and observes four
main categories of information provided in conference calls:
x Relatively detailed, objective quantitative information on both non-financial and
financial indicators of performance such as revenue breakdowns by product, customer
or region, backlog, the number of new customers, the number of units shipped and the
employee headcount.
x Subjective, qualitative observations on issues such as industry trends (e.g. pricing,
market size and market growth), assessments of competitors’ new product offerings,
customers’ responses to the company’s own new products and developments in the
company’s supply chain and distribution channels.
x Relatively detailed information on management’s plans for the future, on topics such
as cost reductions, working capital management and the timing and features of new
product introductions.
x Management’s guidance on future financial results such as expected revenue growth,
gross margins, selling, general and administrative expenses and the effective tax rate.
Since earnings conference calls are a relatively new phenomenon, research on conference
calls is limited. In particular, apart from the small sample study by Tasker, little extant
The Role of Analyst Conference Calls in Capital Markets
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research analyses the content of the conference call on a large scale. Since transcripts of
conference calls were not broadly available before the Regulation Fair Disclosure era (and
are still not available on a large scale outside the United States), the difficulty of analysing
(recorded) spoken language is likely to have prevented many researchers from engaging in
content analysis. However, due to Regulation Fair Disclosure, transcripts have become
available for a large majority of the conference calls conducted by firms listed on NYSE
and NASDAQ. For most calls of these firms, transcripts are available from the start of
2002 through services such as Voxant FD wire (available through Factiva). This research
exploits the fact that this data is now available and the three papers, on which this research
is based, are among the first to analyse the content of conference calls on a large scale.
1.2 Subject of this research
This dissertation is based on three papers. All three papers examine transcripts of analyst
calls. The data used in the analysis consists of transcripts of analyst calls conducted in the
period 2003–05 by firms listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ. In order to analyse the length,
intangibles disclosures and tone of the analyst call, software is used to count (specific)
words in the transcripts. This data is used to examine three aspects related to the role of
analysts in conference calls — length, the disclosure of intangible assets and tone
(optimism versus pessimism).
Chapter 2 focuses on the length of conference calls. A unique feature of conference calls
compared to other disclosure media is that the second part of the conference call is
interactive. This interactivity may affect the dynamics of the disclosure process. In
particular, the interactivity may be a source for the incremental informative nature of the
conference call above the preceding earnings announcement. Analysts may elicit
information from management when management fails to spontaneously provide the
information. The presence of analysts may, therefore, improve the effectiveness of
financial reporting. The results of Chapter 2 suggest that analysts play an active role in
uncovering information during conference calls, resulting in a richer information
environment than might otherwise exist.
Chapter 3 takes a more detailed look at the topical content of conference calls. Since the
conference call is incremental to the preceding earnings announcement, it may play a role
in providing information to capital markets with respect to subjects for which the
accounting information provided in the earnings announcement is notoriously limited. For
many years, it has been suggested that one such area is information on intangible assets.
Chapter 3 investigates whether disclosures in conference calls about intangible assets are
Introduction
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informative to the market. The results show that stock markets respond to disclosures
about internal intangible assets (e.g. research and development), external intangible assets
(e.g. brand names) and human capital-related intangible assets. Additional analysis is
provided with respect to the dynamics of intangible asset disclosures.
Chapter 4 focuses on incentives of analysts to voice optimism on the conference call.
Analysts may refrain from asking certain questions in a public setting because their
questions constitute work product (Unger, 2001), i.e. by revealing their questions on the
call, analysts share the results of their work with other analysts, which reduces the
uniqueness and incremental value of their work. They may also add a bias to the tone of
their language in the conference call, to appease management or their buy-side clients. An
incentive to appease management is to preserve access to management in the future.
Analysts may moderate the tone of their language to appease their buy-side clients because
buy-side clients with long positions are likely to prefer that analysts do not voice their
negative views publicly, but only privately to their buy-side clients.
The results in Chapter 4 indicate that analysts moderate their tone when there is bad news.
They further indicate that, in case the true beliefs of analysts are negative, analysts
moderate their tone when institutional holdings in the firm are high.
Collectively, the research presented in this dissertation provides evidence of the relevance
of earnings conference calls as disclosure events. It further suggests that the dynamics of
conference calls affect the information production in capital markets and the way in which
information flows to the market. The better understanding of why conference calls are
useful and how the dynamics of the call affect information production should be useful
knowledge for regulators and standard setters. This knowledge may be considered in
developing new accounting standards for the disclosure of intangible assets and for
assessing the effectiveness of Regulation Fair Disclosure.
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2 What makes conference calls useful?2
2.1 Introduction
Over the past decade, conference calls have become an increasingly common form of
voluntary disclosure (Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller 2003) and prior studies suggest that
these calls are significant information events (Frankel, Johnson and Skinner 1999; Bowen,
Davis and Matsumoto 2002; Kimbrough 2005). Conference calls may be incrementally
informative over a press release for at least two reasons. First, managers are able to provide
information in a less constrained fashion (relative to financial statements and written press
releases). Second, analysts play a direct role in uncovering information during the question
and answer session by asking follow-up questions, requesting more detail or perhaps
questioning management’s interpretation of events. The purpose of this paper is to
investigate how the interplay between management and analysts affects the informative
nature of conference calls.
We examine this issue by studying the relation between the amount and content of
information provided by management during the presentation portion of the call and the
amount of information revealed in the discussion portion that follows. During the
presentation portion of the call, managers provide their interpretation of the firm’s
performance during the quarter and provide any additional, voluntary disclosures they wish
to communicate to participants on the call. During the discussion portion of the call,
analysts have the opportunity to question management’s interpretation and/or elicit
additional information that was not discussed during the presentation.3 If analysts play an
active role in uncovering information, we expect discussion periods to be longer when
managers provide abnormally low levels of information in the presentation portion of the
2 This chapter is based on joint work with Dawn Matsumoto of the University of Washington and Maarten Pronk,
of Erasmus University. I thank Willemijn van Eijck and Rosiandra de Jesus for their valuable research assistance.
I also appreciate the comments of Orie Barron, Bob Bowen, Dave Burgstahler, Andy Call, Shuping Chen, Weili
Ge, Bill Mayew, Shiva Rajgopal, Terry Shevlin, Mark Soliman, Jim Vincent and workshop participants at the
Free University Amsterdam, INSEAD, Penn State University, Tilburg University, the University of Texas and the
University of Washington.
3 While it is possible that other, non-analyst call participants could ask questions during the discussion portion of
the call, practically speaking, the vast majority of questions are from analysts.
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call. In contrast, if the primary advantage of conference calls lies not with the interplay
between managers and analysts but simply with the ability for managers to disclose
information in a less constrained fashion (than a written press release), then we would not
expect a negative relation between the length of the presentation and the length of the
discussion period. In addition, it is possible that analysts could question managers when
relatively less information is provided during the presentation and managers could refuse
to answer. If this were the case, we would also not find a negative relation between
presentation length and discussion length.
Our analyses are based on transcripts of over 10,000 earnings announcement-related
conference calls (obtained from Voxant via Factiva) held during regular trading hours for
the period January 2003 to December 2005. To test our hypothesis, we first determine the
extent to which the length of the presentation is abnormal and then determine the
association between abnormal length of the presentation and the length of the discussion,
i.e. we run two-stage regressions. In the first stage, we regress the length of the
presentation on numerous factors that are likely to influence the amount and type of
disclosures managers provide in their presentation. We include both firm- and quarter-
specific factors (such as firm performance, the earnings surprise and the occurrence of
unusual events) as well as firm-specific factors (such as size, analyst following and
growth). We also include firm dummies to provide control for other firm-specific factors
that are likely to influence the length of presentations (including manager-specific
characteristics such as verbosity).
Consistent with prior findings, we find that managers provide longer disclosures when
reporting bad news (Baginski et al. 2004). We also find that managers provide longer
disclosures when reporting larger earnings surprises, when earnings contain special items
and when the firm engages in non-recurring events such as mergers and acquisitions and/or
restructurings. Overall, our model is able to explain 76% of the variations in presentation
length.
We use the residuals from these regressions (labelled “abnormal presentation length”) as a
measure of the extent to which managers provide relatively low (or high) levels of
disclosure, given the circumstances of the firm. We then regress the length of the
discussion period on the presentation residuals. Consistent with our conjecture, there is a
negative relation between abnormal presentation length and discussion length, consistent
with the idea that analysts probe managers more when they provide relatively little
information upfront and that managers oblige by providing more disclosure in the
discussion period. Moreover, we find that the relation is stronger for firms with greater
What Makes Conference Calls Useful?
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analyst following them, consistent with our explanation that analyst involvement results in
the uncovering of information during the discussion portion of the call.
We also find that when we divide the abnormal presentation length variable into positive
and negative values (positive values indicating presentations that are relatively long and
negative values indicating presentation that are relatively short), we find abnormally short
presentations are followed by longer discussions but abnormally long presentations do not
lead to shorter discussion. In fact, it appears that abnormally long presentations also lead to
longer discussions, although the magnitude of the relation is substantially smaller than for
abnormally short presentations.4
Our conclusions are based on the assumption that the length of the presentation portion and
the discussion portion of a call is a reasonable proxy for information content. In Section
2.4.3, we provide evidence to support this assumption by examining the relation between
call length and revisions in analysts’ forecasts. We find that longer calls result in greater
revisions in analysts’ forecasts and increased forecast accuracy. Together, our results
suggest that analysts play an important role in forming the information content of
conference calls by probing managers during the discussion phase when they provide
relatively little information upfront. Moreover, managers are apparently willing to respond
to analysts’ request for information by providing at least some additional information.
We also examine the content of management’s presentation, focusing on two particular
dimensions of content — financial (versus non-financial) and forward-looking (versus
backward-looking). Given that one of analysts’ primary tasks is to forecast future earnings,
we conjecture that analysts prefer financial disclosures and forward-looking disclosures.
Thus, we predict that discussion periods will be longer when managers provide abnormally
low levels of financial or forward-looking disclosures.
Similar to our previous analysis, we regress the proportion of financially oriented words in
the presentation and the proportion of forward-looking words in the presentation on a
number of control variables (the same variables used in our regression of presentation
length) in order to estimate abnormal levels of financial and forward-looking disclosures.
Results from this first-stage regression indicate that presentations contain more financially
oriented words when reporting good news and in the presence of special items,
4 The fact that our results are not driven by abnormally long presentations followed by short discussion periods
also addresses the alternative explanation that our finding is the result of some conference calls being constrained
to a certain time limit (i.e. when managers’ presentations are abnormally long, discussion periods will, by
necessity, be cut short due to time constraints).
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discontinued operations and/or restructurings. We also find some evidence that firms
provide more forward-looking information when reporting bad news.
We then examine the impact of abnormal levels of financial and forward-looking
information on discussion length. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a negative a
relation between discussion length and the financial residual, suggesting that fewer
financial disclosures in the presentation results in longer discussion periods. However,
inconsistent with our hypothesis, we find a positive relation between discussion length and
our forward-looking residual, suggesting that more forward-looking disclosures in the
presentation lead to longer discussion periods. One possibility is that forward-looking
disclosures are inherently less verifiable and, as a result, analysts’ require greater
justification for these statements.
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. This is the first study to examine the
interplay between managers and analysts in conference calls, adding to our understanding
of the benefits of conference calls as a disclosure mechanism. Our evidence suggests that
analysts are able to elicit additional disclosures from managers when their initial
disclosures are abnormally short. Thus, the benefit of conference calls is not solely due to
managers’ ability to provide expanded disclosures in a less formal forum but is also due to
analysts’ active involvement in the call. It appears managers cannot anticipate all the
information needs of analysts and, therefore, the discussion period provides analysts an
opportunity to shape public disclosures made by the firm.
Second, this is one of the first studies to examine actual conference call transcripts to
examine the quantity and type of disclosures in a firm’s conference call.5 We are also the
first to examine the extent of financial and forward-looking disclosures made in conference
calls. Prior studies have generally only examined the existence of conference calls as a
measure of firm disclosure (Frankel et al. 1999; Tasker 1999; Bowen et al. 2002) because
data on the actual content of calls was not available. Examining the quantity and type of
disclosures made during conference calls can provide new insights into managers’
disclosure decisions. Since it is probably difficult for a firm not to host a call once it has
5 In concurrent work, Frankel, Mayew and Sun (2007) examine the impact of missing analysts’ expectations by a
penny on the length and tone of conference calls and on the probability of issuing forward-looking guidance.
Consistent with the results of our first stage regression, they find that firms who miss analyst forecasts have
longer conference calls. Our studies differ in that we focus on the relation between information provided in the
presentation and subsequent discussion periods whereas they focus primarily on the relation between missing
analysts’ expectations and overall call length and tone (both presentations and discussions combined).
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established a policy of doing so, the manager’s primary disclosure decision (once the
decision to host a call has been made) is what and how much to disclose on the call. The
determinants of the decision to begin hosting conference calls are not necessarily the same
as the determinants of the quantity and type of disclosures to make on a call and while
prior studies provide evidence of the former, we provide evidence on the latter. For
example, prior studies find that firms who host conference calls are more profitable than
those that do not (Frankel et al. 1999), while we find that firms disclose more information
in calls when earnings performance is poor.
In the next section, we discuss the prior literature and our hypotheses. We discuss our
sample and variable measurement in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results of our
analysis of the relation between presentation length and discussion length. Section 5
presents the results of our analysis of the content of presentations and the impact on
discussion period length. Section 6 is the conclusion.
2.2 Prior literature and hypothesis development
2.2.1 Management disclosures during the presentation and discussion period
length
A number of prior studies find evidence suggesting that conference calls held in
conjunction with an earnings announcement are incrementally informative over the
accompanying press release. Frankel, Johnson and Skinner (1999) document abnormal
trading volume and return volatility during the call period — where trading volume and
return volatility are measured relative to a period after the press release is issued but before
the conference call period. Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto (2002) find that analyst forecast
accuracy increases after earnings announcements that include conference calls versus those
that do not. Kimbrough (2005) finds that the market under-reacts less to current earnings
when conference calls are hosted in conjunction with an earnings announcement relative to
when a call is not hosted.
The reason conference calls are incrementally informative could be due to one or both of
the following factors:
x First, it is possible managers voluntarily provide new or different information in the
conference call relative to the press release. Frankel et al. (1999) conjecture that
“conference calls, being less formal than written press releases, are subject to a lower
standard of legal liability than statements made during press releases.” If managers
believe this to be true, they may be willing to provide certain information during the
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presentation portion of the call that they would not be willing to provide in a press
release. This additional information would make the call more informative.
x Second, analysts’ active involvement during the discussion phase of the conference
call could result in the revelation of additional information. That is, managers may
reveal information as a direct result of analysts’ questions — information that they
might not otherwise have disclosed. There are two reasons managers might not
initially disclose certain information. First, managers may be unaware that a particular
piece of information is important. If you assume that managers of high-growth
companies are less sure of the information needs of investors because of the changing
nature of their business environment, then the fact that high-growth companies are
more likely to host conference calls (Frankel et al. 1999; Tasker 1998) is consistent
with the idea that managers use conference calls so that analysts can participate and
help identify what information should be disclosed.
In addition, it is possible that managers do not initially reveal certain information because
they would prefer not to. In general, disclosure models assume that managers will disclose
good news and not bad news. However, the failure to disclose information will be inferred
as bad news, which can lead to an unravelling of the information unless there are reasons
for non-disclosure such as the existence of proprietary costs (Verrecchia 1983) or
uncertainty about the arrival of information (Dye 1985). A third possible reason for non-
disclosure is that managers are unaware that certain information is value-relevant to
investors. However, if analysts’ directly ask managers for this information, this possibility
is removed and managers will be forced to disclose the information. In other words, if
managers fail to disclose certain information in the press release, the market may not
necessarily be able to infer the lack of disclosure as bad news if it is possible that the
manager did not know the market wanted this information. However, if analysts directly
ask managers for this information in the discussion portion of the conference call, this
“excuse” for non-disclosure is not viable and the manager will disclose the information to
avoid the inevitable negative inference that would be made from a manager’s
unwillingness to disclose.
To summarise, the manager may not disclose all relevant information in either the press
release or the presentation portion of the call. If analysts’ play an active role in uncovering
important information that managers fail to disclose in the presentation and if managers
comply with analysts’ requests for additional information, we expect the discussion portion
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of the call to be longer when the presentation portion of the call is relatively brief.6 Thus,
our first hypothesis is:
H1: Analyst discussion periods are longer when management’s presentation
is abnormally short.
The above hypothesis suggests a negative relation between presentation length and
discussion length. However, we do not necessarily expect the relation to be symmetric for
cases when the manager provides abnormally low levels of information versus situations
when the manager provides abnormally high levels of information. When management’s
presentation is abnormally short, we expect analysts to probe managers to disclose more
information, leading to longer discussions. However, when the presentation is abnormally
long, it is possible that the greater length is due to managers providing marginally relevant
information. Thus, it is less clear that abnormally long calls will necessarily lead to shorter
discussion periods. We therefore hypothesise:
H2: The negative relation between analyst discussion periods and abnormal
presentation length is weaker for abnormally long presentations relative
to abnormally short presentations.
Tests of this hypothesis also help address a potential alternative explanation — that the
negative relation between abnormal presentation length and discussion period length is due
to time constraints imposed on conference calls. If managers only allot a certain amount of
time to conference calls, then when managers’ presentations are abnormally long,
discussion periods may be cut short — leading to a negative relation between the two
6 An alternative way to address the issue of the “value added” by analysts during conference calls is to examine
the intra-day trading during the presentation versus the discussion portion of the call. This approach is
problematic, however, because it assumes trading that occurs during each portion of the call is attributable solely
to information disclosed during that portion of the call. It is possible (perhaps likely) that news disclosed during
the presentation portion of the call could result in trading during the discussion portion of the call (if there is a lag
in information processing or trade execution) and since discussions always follow presentations, this fact would
give the appearance that discussion periods are more informative than presentation periods when that might not
necessarily be the case. This issue is less problematic when analysing the information content of the presentation
portion and discussion portion individually (as we do in the next chapter), since it is possible to control the
absolute return during the presentation while analysing the discussion. Since, however, we are focussing on the
association between the information in the presentation portion and the information in the discussion portion, the
lag in information processing or trade execution may become problematic.
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variables. However, if time constraints are the primary driver for the negative relation, we
should see a stronger negative relation in the case of abnormally long presentations versus
abnormally short presentations.
Finally, if analysts probe managers when they fail to provide sufficient information during
the presentation portion of the call, we would expect firm’s with greater analyst following
to display a stronger negative relation between abnormal presentation length and
discussion period length. Thus, we hypothesise:
H3: The relation between analyst discussion periods and abnormal
presentation length is stronger for firms with greater analyst following.
2.2.2 Content of the presentation and discussion period length
Tests of the previous hypotheses will shed light on whether analysts’ participation in
conference calls — and, in particular, their ability to elicit information that managers fail
to disclose in the presentation — is a source of the incremental information content of
conference calls over press releases. We also examine the type of disclosures made by
managers in the presentation and their effects on the discussion period. This examination
will provide further insight into the type of information that analysts’ prefer.
In general, conference call presentations include a recap of the firm’s financial
performance during the past quarter as well as disclosures of non-financial information
such as new products, customers or strategic alliances. In addition to discussing past
performance, managers also often discuss future plans and expectations. Thus, we examine
the content of the call along two dimensions — financial and forward-looking. While there
are obviously many other dimensions which one could examine, we believe these are two
of the more significant dimensions.7
Analysts’ primary responsibility is to provide investment recommendations on the stocks
they follow (Schipper 1991). Along with providing stock recommendations, analysts’ also
produce earnings forecasts that are inputs into their stock recommendations (Bradshaw
2004). In generating these earnings estimates, analysts often build spreadsheet models that
7 Also, because of the way the data for these measures are computed, we are unable to cross the two attributes,
that is, we cannot measure the extent of financial, backward-looking information versus financial forward-looking
information.
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project future income based on various assumptions of margins, investments, growth, etc.
(Hutton 2004). Given the need to generate these models, we expect analysts to have high
demand for financial and forward-looking information. Thus, when managers fail to
provide this information in the presentation portion of the call, we expect it to lead to
longer discussion periods. We hypothesise:
H4: Analyst discussion periods are longer when the financial or forward-
looking nature of management’s presentation is abnormally low.
2.3 Data and variable measurement
2.3.1 Sample selection
We begin our sample selection process by identifying announcements of earnings-related
conference calls (via Dow Jones Calendar of Corporate Events) held during trading hours
(calls beginning after 9:30 a.m. and before 2:30 p.m. EST) by NYSE/NASDAQ firms
between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2005. This process yields 19,041 potential
conference calls. We limit our sample to calls held during trading hours because we
include a market-based measure of news in the earnings announcement as an independent
variable (explained in Section 2.3.3), and we use actual returns during the presentation and
discussion in the additional analysis in Note 38.8 We then gather transcripts of calls from
Voxant FD wire available through Factiva. We are unable to find transcripts for 5,234
calls, leaving us with a sample of 13,807 conference call transcripts.9 We lose 2,634
8 Of the initial sample of 36,074 calls, 39.6% of firms always hold calls during trading hours, 35.4% always hold
calls after trading hours, 14.6% switched once during the three-year period either from during to after or vice
versa and 10.4% switched more than once. Thus, it appears that the decision to hold calls during or after trading
hours tends to be a policy decision that is firm-specific. We compared the four groups of firms on several
dimensions including size, analyst following, market-to-book, leverage, performance and length of presentation
and discussion. The only differences that we find are: 1) firms that always hold calls during trading hours are
larger and have more leverage than firms that always hold calls after trading hours; 2) firms that hold calls after
trading hours have higher market-to-book ratios than firms that switch once. Since none of the groups differ in
terms of call length, the fact that we examine only calls held during trading hours likely does not bias our results.
However, this may limit how much we may generalise our results to the extent firms that host calls after hours
behave differently from firms who host calls during trading hours.
9 We suspect that the availability of transcripts on Voxant may be related to firm size and analyst coverage. We
compare firms with transcripts available on Voxant to those without and indeed find that firms with transcripts
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observations due to missing Trade and Quote (TAQ) intraday stock price data, Institutional
Brokers Estimates System (I/B/E/S) analyst forecast data, Compustat quarterly financial
statement data and/or stock price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). Finally, because our analyses include firm-fixed effects, we eliminate firms with
less than four conference calls (1,321 observations). Our final sample is 10,062 firm-
quarters. Table 2.1, Panel A details our sample selection process.
Table 2.1, Panel B presents the distribution of our sample across calendar quarters.10 We
have the most observations in 2004, followed by 2005 and then 2003. The fact that the
sample declines in 2005 appears to be due to missing transcripts on Factiva on a few
days.11 Panel C shows the distribution of calls per firm across our sample. We have all 12
conference calls (four per year for three years) for only a small fraction of firms. The
reasons for this include missing Compustat, IBES, CRSP or TAQ data; missing transcripts
on Voxant; calls held outside trading hours and no call listed on the Dow Jones Calendar
of Corporate Events for a particular quarter (due either to missing data or the
initiation/discontinuation of conference calls).12
are larger (in terms of assets and market capitalisation) and more highly followed. This fact does not bias our
results because we include firm-fixed effects in all our analyses but it may limit how much we may generalise our
results to the extent that larger firms behave differently from smaller firms in the way they disclose information.
10 Classification to a calendar quarter is based on the conference call date, not on the fiscal year-end of the
company.
11 For 2005, transcripts appear to be missing on 22 April, 26 April and 28 July. Thus, April and July show a lower
number of calls compared to 2004. If we exclude these two months, the number of observations in 2005 is greater
than in 2004. The decline in 2005 is not the result of firms hosting fewer conference calls in 2005 — the number
of conference calls listed on the Dow Jones Calendar of Corporate Events shows a continuous increase over the
three years (11,046 calls hosted in 2003, 11,880 in 2004 and 13,148). We do not believe these missing transcripts
introduce any systematic bias into our analysis.
12 If we had 12 calls for all 1,318 firms in our sample, we should have 15,816 observations. Of the 5,804 quarters
missing from our sample, 4% is due to missing Compustat , IBES, CRSP, or TAQ data, 29% is due to missing
transcripts, 15% is due to calls held outside trading hours (see footnote 7) and 52% is due to no calls reported on
the Dow Jones Calendar of Corporate Events in that quarter. Of the latter group, it appears that 39% is due to the
initiation or discontinuation of calls (i.e. calls are held either before or after the missing quarter date but not both);
whereas 61% (1,842 quarters) have calls held both before and after the missing quarter date. We randomly
selected 100 of these firms (193 firm-quarters) and searched earnings announcement-related press releases to find
reference to a conference call. In 94% of the cases, we were able to find reference to a conference call suggesting
that the Dow Jones Calendar of Corporate Events has missing observations and not that these firms strategically
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Finally, Panel D of Table 2.1 presents the distribution of our sample across industries,
using the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). We also report the
percent of the population of NYSE and NASDAQ firms comprising each industry
classification. Our sample spans a wide range of industries and, in general, reflects the
general distribution of industries in the population. The one exception is the finance and
insurance industry, which comprises only 18% of our sample but comprises 28% of the
population of NYSE/NASDAQ firms.
decided against hosting a call. Thus, it appears that hosting conference calls tends to be a policy choice for the
vast majority of firms.
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Table 2.1
Sample selection and descriptive data
Panel A: Sample attrition
Earnings-related conference calls held during trading hours 19,043
Transcripts not available on Voxant FD Wire (5,236)
Missing data on TAQ or stock price less than $1.00 (477)
Missing analyst forecast data on IBES (1,753)
Missing Compustat data (305)
Missing CRSP data (46)
Less than four conference calls per firm (1,164)
Final sample 10,062
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Sample selection and descriptive data
Panel D: Distribution of observations across industry
No. of % of % of
NAICS13 Industry Obs. Obs Population14
Manufacturing 3,552 35.30 34.11
Finance and Insurance 1,814 18.03 28.09
Information 645 6.41 10.37
Retail Trade 558 5.55 3.96
Mining 488 4.85 3.12
Professional, Scientific and Technical 391 3.89 4.16
Utilities 336 3.34 2.26
Transportation and Warehousing 300 2.98 2.36
Wholesale Retail 295 2.93 2.58
Administrative and Support, Waste
Management
288 2.86 1.75
Accomodation and Food Services 236 2.35 1.67
Health Care and Social Assistance 213 2.12 1.41
Construction 179 1.78 1.02
Real estate and Leasing 143 1.42 1.51
Other Services 87 0.86 0.38
Art, Entertainment and Recreation 73 0.73 0.42
Educational Services 69 0.69 0.31
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 13 0.13 0.31
Unclassified Establishments 9 0.09 0.21
Missing NAICS Code 373 3.71
10,062 100.00 100.00
13 NAICS stands for the North American Industry Classification System.
14 Percentage of population is the percent of firms on the NYSE and NASDAQ in each NAICS industry
classification.
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2.3.2 Dependent variables
To measure our dependent variables, we split the transcripts into the presentation and
discussion portion of the call by searching for the first occurrence of the word "operator"
after the first 1,500 characters of the transcript. We then check whether the transcripts were
split appropriately by searching the first 400 characters of the discussion for key words or
phrases that are typically associated with the start of the discussion — for example,
"instructions", "question-and-answer", "the floor is now open" and "at this time". For
discussion transcripts that did not include any of the key words, we performed the split
manually. In addition, each transcript includes a legal disclaimer at the end of the
document. We removed this disclaimer from all transcripts.
Our primary measure of conference call length is based on the number of words in the
presentation (LENGTHPRES) and discussion (LENGTHDISC) portions of the call.
LENGTHCC represents the total number of words for the entire call. We also measured: 1)
number of questions/remarks made by analysts during the discussion (#QUESTION), 2)
the number of unique analysts asking questions/making remarks during the discussion
(#ANALYSTS), 3) the number of words spoken by analysts during the discussion
(#WORDSANAL), and 4) the number of words spoken by company representatives
(#WORDSCOMP). Our main analysis is based on the LENGTHDISC but we provide
additional descriptive statistics of these other measures to provide further insight into the
discussion period.
Table 2.2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics on these variables. We also present
histograms of LENGTHPRES and LENGTHDISC in Figure 1, Panels A and B. Across our
sample, the average length of the presentation is approximately 2,900 words and the
average length of the discussion portion of the call is 4,400 words. The inter-quartile
ranges for the presentation and discussion periods are approximately 1,600 and 2,700
words respectively. Thus, discussion periods tend to be longer and are somewhat more
variable in length than presentation periods. On average, there are 7.5 analysts
participating during the call and they ask/make approximately 44 questions/remarks. In
general, company representatives speak twice as many words as analysts during the
discussion periods (2,900 versus 1,400 words). Thus, managers do the majority of talking
during the discussion portion of the call, quite likely in response to analyst
questions/remarks and reflecting the information needs of analysts.
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Table 2.2
Descriptive statistics on dependent variables
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on call length (N = 10,062)
1st 3rd Std IQ
Variable15 Mean Quartile Median Quartile Deviation Range
LENGTHPRES 2928.27 2048.00 2798.50 3638.00 1246.74 1590.00
LENGTHDISC 4438.30 2977.00 4341.50 5687.00 2055.90 2710.00
LENGTHCC 7366.57 5576.00 7339.50 8976.00 2488.36 3400.00
#QUESTION 43.88 27.00 41.00 57.00 23.65 30.00
#ANALYST 7.57 5.00 7.00 10.00 3.76 5.00
#WORDSANAL 1384.01 852.00 1290.00 1763.00 787.36 911.00
#WORDSCOMP 2899.90 1831.00 2769.50 3774.00 1503.64 1943.00
#MINPRES 18.29 12.79 17.48 22.73 7.79 9.93
#MINDISC 28.25 18.95 27.64 36.20 13.09 17.25
#MINCC 46.55 35.21 46.38 56.74 15.76 21.53
IQPRES 745.04 401.00 630.00 964.00 531.86
IQDISC 1643.96 1035.00 1490.00 2109.50 851.89
IQCC 1840.28 1146.00 1652.00 2337.00 965.13
15 LENGTHPRES, LENGTHDISC, and LENGTHCC are the number of words spoken during the presentation,
discussion and entire conference call respectively. #QUESTION is the number of times an analyst asks a question
or makes a remark during the discussion. #ANALYST is the number of analysts participating in the call.
#WORDSANAL (#WORDSCOMP ) is the number of words spoken by analysts (company representatives) during the
discussion. #MINPRES, #MINDISC, #MINCC are the estimated number of minutes of the presentation, discussion and
entire conference call respectively, based on the median number of words spoken per minute based on a sub-
sample of 1,263 calls for which we have the exact start and end times of the presentation and discussion. IQPRES,
IQDISC and IQCC are the firm-specific inter-quartile ranges of the number of words in the presentation, discussion,
and entire conference call respectively
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Table 2.2 (continued)
Descriptive statistics on dependent variables
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on financial and forward-looking disclosures (N = 10,062)
1st 3rd Std IQ
Variable16 Mean Quartile Median Quartile Deviation Range
%FINPRES
0.039 0.030 0.038 0.046 0.012 0.016
%FINDISC
0.017 0.012 0.016 0.021 0.007 0.009
%FUTUREPRES 0.021 0.017 0.021 0.024 0.006 0.007
%FUTUREDISC 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.028 0.005 0.007
16 %FINPRES and %FINDISC are the percentages of financial words spoken during the presentation and discussion
respectively. Please refer to Exhibit 1 for the list of financially-oriented words used to define these variables.
%FUTUREPRES and %FUTUREDISC are the percentages of forward-looking words spoken during the presentation
and discussion respectively. Please refer to Exhibit 2 for the list of forward-looking words used to define these
variables.
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Figure 1
Distribution of conference call length (in words)
Panel A: Distribution of presentation length (LENGTHPRES)
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Panel B: Distribution of discussion length (LENGTHDISC)
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We also use a sub-sample of 1,263 conference calls (made between January 2005 and
March 2005) for which we have exact start and end times for each segment of the call to
provide some perspective on the length of calls in minutes. We match the times to our
transcripts and calculate the number of words spoken per minute in the presentation and
discussion portions of the call. We use the median number of words spoken per minute
(160 and 157 for the presentation and discussion portions of the call respectively) to
compute the approximate length, in minutes, of the presentation (#MINPRES) and discussion
(#MINDISC) portions of the call. Statistics on these variables are also reported in Table 2.2,
Panel A. The average length of the presentation is approximately 18 minutes while the
average length of the discussion is 28 minutes. The inter-quartile ranges are approximately
10 and 17 minutes for the presentation and discussion respectively. Thus, while prior
studies generally assume that conference calls last for 60 minutes following the start time
of the call (Frankel et al 2002; Bushee et al. 2003), there is significant cross-sectional
variation in the length of calls.
We also provide some evidence on within-firm variation in call length by computing the
inter-quartile range of LENGTHPRES and LENGTHDISC (IQPRES and IQDISC) by firm.
Several interesting observations arise from these descriptive statistics. First, within-firm
variation in conference call length is significantly less than cross-sectional variation in
length. For example, the average within-firm inter-quartile range for conference call length
is approximately 1,840 words (or approximately 12 minutes), whereas the cross-sectional
inter-quartile range is approximately 3,400 words (or 21 minutes). The fact that cross-
sectional variation in conference call length is greater than within-firm variation suggests
that firm characteristics, which tend to be stable across time — such as size and analyst
following — play a large role in explaining cross-sectional differences in conference call
length. Still, prior empirical and theoretical research suggests that firm-quarter specific
factors (e.g. performance) also likely play a role in determining disclosure levels.
Moreover, there are other time-invariant factors that likely impact the length of the
presentation and discussion — such as managerial verbosity — that it would be beneficial
to filter out. Thus, our analyses are all based on firm-fixed effects models.
Second, the average within-firm inter-quartile range for discussion periods (1,644 words or
about 10.5 minutes) is more than twice as large as the average inter-quartile range for
presentation periods (754 words or about 5 minutes), indicating significantly greater
within-firm variation in discussion period length. This difference is not surprising as firms
have greater control over the length of presentations than over discussion periods. In
addition, presentations are likely to follow a general pattern or template for a given firm,
leading to less variation in presentations. This fact, however, does not necessarily imply
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that there is too little variation in presentation length to capture a relation with discussion
length. As discussed further below, we measure “abnormal” presentation length based on a
model of expected presentation length. The fact that managers do not vary their
presentation length in circumstances when they would be expected to is likely to lead to
longer discussion periods.
We measure financial orientation based on a word count of financially oriented words.
Exhibit A presents the list of words we used to define this variable.18 We compute the
percentage of financially oriented words in the presentation as a percentage of the total
words in the presentation (%FINPRES). For comparison purposes, we also compute the
percentage of financially oriented word in the discussion as a percentage of the total words
in the discussion (%FINDISC). Table 2.2, Panel B presents descriptive statistics on these
variables. On average, a higher percentage of words spoken during the presentation (3.9%)
is financially oriented than during the discussion (1.7%).
18 We first randomly selected 900 conference calls and identified all words occurring more than 10 times. From
these 7,892 words, we identified words that we consider financial in nature.
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Exhibit 1
List of financially oriented words
accounting derivatives leases revenues
accrual dividend leasing ROA
accruals dividends lending ROE
accrued dollar leverage ROI
allowance dollars liabilities sales
allowances earnings liability securities
amortization EBIT liquidity securitization
amortize EBITDA loan security
amortized EPS loans selling
asset equities loss shares
assets equity losses swaps
bond euro margin tax
borrowed euros margins taxable
borrowing expenditure obligations taxes
borrowings expenditures payable unamortized
budget expense payables unleveraged
budgeted expenses payment warrants
budgeting finance payments
buybacks financed pound
capex financial pounds
capital financially prepaid
capitalization financials prepayment
capitalize financing prepayments
capitalized financings Pretax
cash gain profit
cent gains profitability
cents goodwill profits
convertible hedge receivable
cost hedged receivables
costs hedges redeemable
covenants hedging refinance
(Continued on next page)
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(Exhibit 1 – Continued)
currencies impaired refinanced
debentures impairment refinancing
debt impairments rent
debts income rental
deferrals interest rentals
deposit investment repurchasing
deposits investments reserve
depreciation lease reserves
derivative leased revenue
Our measure of forward-looking disclosures is based on a linguistic analysis tool called
LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count).19 The software computes the percentage of
words that are past, present and future-oriented based on a dictionary established by the
creators of the software. As the software was designed to analyse texts in a general context,
the words included in the dictionary are quite general (please refer to Exhibit 2 for the list
of words designated by the software as being future-oriented). The list is quite short
because only a handful of verbs signal future tense (primarily “shall” and “will”).20
However, in business communications, there are other words that are often agreed upon as
signifying a discussion of the future, despite the fact that the words are technically present
tense (e.g. “expects”, “anticipates”, “intends”, etc.). Earnings press releases often include a
disclaimer about forward-looking statements that includes a list of words management
believes signify such statements. Examining a random sample of press releases, we
identify a list of words used in such disclaimers and augment the list of words used by
LIWC (please refer to Exhibit 2). We then compute the percentage of forward-looking
words in the presentation (FUTUREPRES) as well as in the discussion (FUTUREPRES) as our
measure of forward-looking disclosures. Table 2.2, Panel B presents descriptive statistics
on these variables. On average, presentation and discussion periods have similar levels of
forward-looking disclosures (means of 2.1% and 2.4% for presentation and discussion
respectively).
19 The software is available at http://www.liwc.net. This software was also used in Li (2006)
20 We thank Professor James Pennebaker (UT-Austin) for sharing their dictionary with us. We also thank him for
his insights regarding future tense in the English language.
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Exhibit 2
List of forward-looking words
From LIWC21 Additional words22
be expect
he'll expects
i'll intend
it'll intends
may anticipate
might anticipates
shall plan
she'll plans
they'll believe
tomorrow believes
we'll projects
will project
won't looking forward
you'll going forward
look forward
go forward
looking ahead
would
should
could
Finally, we present a correlation matrix of all our dependent measures in Table 2.2, Panel
D after subtracting the within-firm mean from each variable (Spearman [Pearson]
correlations reported above [below] the diagonal). Several interesting observations emerge
from this table. First, the length of the discussion is more highly correlated with the overall
length of the call (r = 0.89) than the length of the presentation (r = 0.42), indicating that
21 Words designated by LIWC (see http://www.liwc.net) as future-oriented.
22 Additional words included based on an analysis of a sample of disclaimers included in company press releases
as indicating forward-looking statements.
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analyst discussion periods are a bigger determinant of overall call length than managers’
presentations. Second, the words spoken by company representatives are more highly
related to the length of the discussion (r = 0.90) than the words spoken by analysts (r =
0.69). Thus, the length of the discussion is largely determined by managers’ answers rather
than analysts’ questions. Finally, there is a negative relation between financial disclosures
and forward-looking disclosures in the presentation portion of the call but not in the
discussion phase. Thus, it appears that managers’ financial disclosures during the
presentation portion of the call are more likely to be discussions about past performance.
Since a portion of most conference call presentations are devoted to a recapitulation of the
prior quarter’s financial performance, this correlation is perhaps not surprising.
2.4 Relation between presentation and discussion period lengths
2.4.1 Measuring abnormal presentation length
To test the relation between presentation length and discussion length, we first model the
determinants of presentation length to generate measures of “unexpected” or “abnormal”
presentation length. The first four variables included in our model are measures of
performance. The first two measure performance over the entire quarter (one being a
measure of earnings performance and the other based on stock market performance), while
the other two measure the unexpected performance at the time of the earnings release:
ROA – Earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat quarterly item 8) divided by total
assets (Compustat quarterly item 44) at year-end.
RETQTR – Market-adjusted returns cumulated from calendar day –92 to day –2 relative to
the conference call date, which approximates returns over the quarter (excluding the
earnings announcement return).
RETDAYB4 – Returns in the 24 hours prior to the conference call, measured as the quote
midpoint at the start of the conference call (MIDstart) less the quote midpoint at the same
time one trading day before the conference call (MIDdayprior) divided by MIDdayprior (data
obtained from the TAQ database). 23
23 For approximately 98% of our sample, the conference call date coincides with the earnings announcement date
per Compustat or is one day later. Thus, returns in the 24 hours prior to the call capture the market reaction to the
press release in the vast majority of cases.
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MISS – A dummy variable equal to 1 if actual EPS for the quarter (per IBES unsplit-
adjusted actuals file) is less than the mean consensus forecast EPS for the quarter (per
IBES unsplit-adjusted summary file) and zero otherwise.
Prior studies have generally found a positive relation between performance and disclosure
(Lev and Penman 1990; Lang and Lundholm 1993; Miller 2002; Frankel et al. 1999).
However, many of these studies focus on the decision to make a disclosure rather than the
volume of information disclosed, once the decision to disclose has been made.24 In
addition, recent studies on supplemental disclosures made with earnings forecasts (Hutton,
Miller and Skinner 2003; Baginski, Hassell and Kimbrough 2004) suggest that managers
may have incentives to provide more disclosures when forecasting bad news, suggesting a
negative relation between the quantity of disclosure and performance.25 Since the
conference calls we examine are held in conjunction with an earnings release, at least a
portion of the disclosures made in the call are “supplementing” the earnings release. Thus,
we expect a negative relation between firm performance and presentation length.26
The next seven variables are intended to capture unexpected economic events during the
quarter that may lead to longer presentations. If nothing significant happens during the
quarter, managers will have less to discuss in the presentation. In contrast, if significant
events do occur, presentations would be expected to be longer and if these are not, analysts
are likely to demand greater disclosure in the discussion period. The variables used are:
24 Once a firm has established a policy of hosting conference calls following their earnings announcements, it is
likely to be very costly for them not to host a call because of poor earnings performance. Thus, while prior
evidence suggests that, on average, firms which host conference calls have better performance, this result does
not necessarily imply that a given firm is more likely to host calls in quarters with better performance. It is more
likely that the above result is driven by the fact that firms are more likely to adopt a policy of hosting calls when
performance is better.
25 Baginski et al. (2004) find evidence consistent with this conjecture, while Hutton et al. (2003) do not. However,
in the Hutton et al. (2003) study, the direction of the effect (while not statistically significant) is in the direction
predicted — firms forecasting bad news provide greater “soft talk” disclosures.
26 This conjecture is also consistent with survey evidence in Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) that indicates
managers perceive conference calls to be longer when firms miss analysts’ earnings forecasts. They report that
“[t]he other statistically significant factor motivating managers to avoid missing earnings benchmarks relates to
the time spent in explaining, especially in conference calls to analysts, why the firm missed the target”. Frankel,
Mayew, and Sun (2007) find evidence consistent with the perceptions reported in Graham et al. (2005) – firms
missing expectations have longer conference calls in total (presentation and discussion periods combined).
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x |RETQTR| – The absolute value of returns during the quarter.
x |RETDAYB4| – The absolute value of returns during the 24 hours prior to the call.
x |FE| – The absolute value of the forecast error, defined as the absolute value of
actual EPS (from IBES unsplit-adjusted actuals file) less the last mean consensus
forecast prior to the earnings announcement (from IBES unsplit-adjusted
summary file) divided by the stock price at the start of the conference call (from
TAQ).
x |SPITEM| – The absolute value of special items (Compustat quarterly item 32)
divided by total assets (Compustat quarterly item 44) at year-end.
x |DISCOP| – The absolute value of discontinued operations (Compustat quarterly
item 33) divided by total assets (Compustat quarterly item 44) at year-end.
x M&APRES – The number of merger- and acquisition-related words (acquisition,
acquisitions, acquisition’s, M&A, merged, merger, merging, pre-acquisition,
synergies, synergy and takeover) in the presentation divided by the total number
of words in the presentation (×100).
x RESTRUCTPRES – The number of restructuring related words (layoffs,
restructure, restructured, restructuring, restructurings, severance) in the
presentation divided by the total number of words in the presentation (×100)
Finally, while we include firm-fixed effects in our model (which controls for static firm-
specific characteristics such as industry membership), it does not eliminate the impact of
other firm-specific characteristics that are not completely static — for example, analyst
following, firm size, etc.27 Since many of these latter characteristics have previously been
shown in the literature to be related to disclosure, we include three additional control
variables:
27 A firm-fixed model likely reduces the impact of these variables significantly because the cross-sectional
variation in these variables is far greater than the within-firm variation.
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x 'SALES – A measure of growth defined as current quarter sales (Compustat
quarterly item 2) less prior-year sales in the same quarter , divided by total assets
(Compustat quarterly item 44).
x AF – A measure of analyst following defined as number of analysts that issued an
EPS forecast for the current quarter (from IBES summary file).
x LNASSETS – A measure of firm size defined as the log of total assets
(Compustat quarterly item 44).
Table 2.3, Panel A provides univariate statistics on these variables. The mean ROA for the
sample is less than 1%. The mean return over the prior quarter is –0.8% and returns in the
24 hours prior to the call are, on average, close to zero (0.1%). However, the majority of
firms met or exceeded analysts’ expectations — only 28.5% missed expectations.
Table 2.3, Panel B presents a correlation matrix of our explanatory and control variables,
after subtracting the within-firm mean from each variable (Spearman correlations reported
above the diagonal and Pearson correlations reported below the diagonal). Not
surprisingly, the four performance variables are correlated with each other — particularly
ROA and MISS (r = –0.18) and MISS and RETDAYB4 (r = –0.27). ROA is also negatively
correlated with |SPITEM| — an indication that the larger magnitude exclusions tend to be
negative (or income deteriorating) in nature.
(1)
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We include fiscal quarter dummy variables (QTR2, QTR3, and QTR4) to control for
differences across quarters in the length of calls and year dummy variables (Y2004 and
Y2005) to control for trends over time in the length of calls. As discussed earlier, we run
the above model including firm-fixed effects.
The results of equation (1) are presented in Panel C of Table 2.3.28 Consistent with prior
research, we find that conference call presentations are longer for firms with poorer
performance, as measured using returns over the quarter (coefficient on RETQTR significant
at p < 0.001). Firms also have longer presentation when the news in the earnings release is
significantly negative (coefficient on RETDAYB4 is significantly negative and coefficient on
MISS is significantly positive). Significant surprising earnings announcements (as
measured by absolute forecast errors and absolute returns in the 24 hours prior) also lead to
longer presentations as do M&A and restructuring activities. Not surprisingly, as firms
expand, they have longer presentations. Presentations also appear to be shortest in the first
fiscal quarter and longest in the fourth fiscal quarter.
28 If we winsorise the top and bottom 1% of observations, we obtain similar results (with the exception that the
coefficient on |SPITEM| is positive and statistically significant at p<0.001). We use the un-winsorised variables
to generate our measure of abnormal presentation length and winsorise the residuals used as the independent
variable in our second stage regression.
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Table2.3
Determinants of presentation length
Panel A: Univariate statistics
1st 3rd Std
Variable29 Mean quartile Median quartile Deviation
ROA 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04
RETQTR -0.008 -0.102 -0.016 0.07 0.17
RETDAYB4 0.00 -0.020 0.00 0.02 0.05
MISS 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45
|RETQTR| 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.16 0.12
|RETDAYB4| 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03
|FE| 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
|SPITEM| 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
|DISCOP| 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Continued on next page)
29 ROA is earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat quarterly item 8) divided by total assets at year-end
(Compustat quarterly item 44). RETQTR is the market-adjusted returns cumulated from day –92 to day –2, relative
to the conference call date. RETDAYB4 is the quote midpoint at the start of the conference call (MIDstart) less the
quote midpoint at the same time one trading day before the conference call (MIDdayprior) divided by MIDdayprior
(from the TAQ database). MISS is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if actual EPS for the quarter (per IBES
unsplit-adjusted actuals file) is less than the mean consensus forecast EPS for the quarter (per IBES unsplit-
adjusted summary file) and zero otherwise. |FE| is the absolute value of actual EPS (from IBES unsplit-adjusted
actuals file) less the last mean consensus forecast prior to the earnings announcement (from IBES unsplit-adjusted
summary file) divided by the stock price at the end of quarter (Compustat quarterly item 14). |SPITEM| is the
absolute value of special items (Compustat quarterly item 32) divided by ending total assets (Compustat quarterly
item 44). |DISCOP| is the absolute value of discontinued operations (Compustat quarterly item 33) divided by
ending total assets (Compustat quarterly item 44). M&APRES is the number of merger and acquisition related
words (acquisition, acquisitions, acquisition’s, M and D, merged, merger, merging, preacquisition, synergies,
synergy and takeover) in the presentation (discussion) divided by the total number of words in the presentation ×
100. RESTRUCTPRES is the number of restructuring-related words (layoffs, restructure, restructured,
restructuring, restructurings, severance) in the presentation divided by the total number of words in the
presentation (discussion) × 100. 'SALES is current quarter sales (Compustat quarterly item 2) less sales in the
same quarter one year earlier, divided by total assets (Compustat quarterly item 44). AF is the number of analysts
that issued an EPS forecast for the current quarter (from IBES summary file). LNASSETS is the log of total
assets (Compustat quarterly item 44).
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(Table 2.3 – Continued)
1st 3rd Std
Variable Mean quartile Median quartile Deviation
M&APRES 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.16
RESTRUCTPRES 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08
'SALES 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.06
AF 7.35 3.00 6.00 10.000 5.88
LNASSETS 7.27 6.05 7.19 8.37 1.78
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Table 2.3 (continued)
Determinants of presentation length
Panel C: Regression of presentation length on hypothesised determinants
LENGTHPRES
Variable32 Pred Coeff. t-stat p-value33
ROA  106.33 0.38 0.645
RETQTR  –179.70 –4.17 0.000
RETDAYB4  –383.48 –2.64 0.004
MISS + 44.15 2.50 0.006
|RETQTR| + –20.22 –0.31 0.621
|RETDAYB4| + 432.76 2.11 0.017
|FE| + 727.27 2.31 0.010
|SPITEM| + 344.34 1.09 0.138
|DISCOP| + –267.12 –0.26 0.603
M&APRES  148.15 2.52 0.006
RESTRUCTPRES  434.92 3.72 0.000
'SALES " 20.97 0.15 0.881
AF ? –0.87 –0.19 0.848
LNASSETS ? 98.41 2.13 0.016
QTR2 ? 125.25 6.66 0.000
QTR3 ? 150.48 7.83 0.000
QTR4 ? 411.09 21.53 0.000
Y2004 ? 107.34 5.97 0.000
Y2005 ? 59.71 2.87 0.002
Firm-fixed Effects Included
N = 10,062, R2 = 0.76
32 See variable definitions in Panel A. QTR2, QTR3 and QTR4 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the conference
call relates to fiscal quarters 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Y2004 and Y2005 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the
conference call is held in 2004 and 2005 respectively.
33 p-values are one-tailed for variables with directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise.
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Overall, the model has an R2 of 76%, indicating that we were able to explain a significant
amount of variation in presentation length. We use the residuals from this model as our
measure of unexpected or abnormal presentation length (ABLNGTHPRES) and use this as
our independent variable in our second-stage regression.
2.4.2 The effect of abnormal presentation length on discussion length
To test hypothesis one, we run the following model:
0 1
DISC PRESLENGTH ABLNGTHE E H   (2)
We expect the coefficient on E1 to be negative – hence managers present
relatively little information in the presentation, analysts will probe more in the discussion.
Note, we do not include any of the determinants of presentation length in this analysis
because the residual from the first-stage regression, ABLNGTHPRES, is by definition
orthogonal to these other variables and including them in the regression has no effect on
E1.
Our second hypothesis posits a stronger relation between ABLNGTHPRES and
LENGTHDISC in situations where managers provide abnormally low levels of information
relative to situations where managers provide abnormally high levels of information
because it is possible that managers are providing a high volume of wrong information. To
test this hypothesis, we allow the coefficient on ABLNGTHPRES to vary for positive and
negative values. Specifically, we define a dummy variable (POS) that is equal to one if
ABLNGTHPRES is positive and zero otherwise. We then interact this variable with
ABLNGTHPRES:
HEEEE u PRESPRESDISC ABLNGTHPOSPOSABLNGTHLENGTH 3210 (3)
We expect the coefficient on E3 to be positive if abnormally long presentations do not lead
to shorter discussion periods as much as abnormally short presentations lead to longer
discussions.
Hypothesis three predicts that the relation between abnormal presentation length and
discussion length is stronger for firms with greater analyst following. We define a dummy
variable (HI_ANAL) equal to 1 if analyst following (AF) is above the median for the entire
sample (AF t 6) and zero otherwise. We then this variable with our variables from model
(3):
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If firms with greater analyst following are more likely to probe managers when they fail to
disclose sufficient information in the presentation portion of the call, then the coefficient
on E5 should be negative. For equations two, three and four, we winsorise the top and
bottom 1% to reduce the impact of outliers on our inferences and, as before, we include
firm-fixed effects.
The results of equation two, reported in the first set of columns of Table 2.4, indicates
support for hypothesis one. Discussion periods are longer, on average, when managers’
presentations are abnormally shorter (t-statistic = –2.53). The effect, however, is not
substantial. An increase in presentation length of 745 words (the average within-firm inter-
quartile range for presentation length) results in a decrease in discussion length of 46
words. However, part of the reason for this low effect is the fact that positive residuals —
indicating abnormally long presentations — do not necessarily result in shorter discussion
periods (i.e., the relation is not symmetric).
The results of equation three, presented in the next set of columns, demonstrate this effect.
The coefficient on ABLNGTHPRES in this equation represents the relation between
abnormal presentation length and discussion length for firms with abnormally short calls
and the coefficient here is –0.4094 (t-statistic = 6.66). A reduction of 745 words in the
presentation would result in an increase of 305 words in the discussion. The coefficient on
the interaction term, POS×ABLNGTHPRES, represents the incremental effect for positive
residuals. The coefficient is significantly positive (t-stat = 6.60) and, in fact, an F-test on
the sum of the two coefficients (ABLNGTHPRES and POS×ABLNGTHPRES) indicates that
the relation between abnormal presentation length and discussion length is statistically
greater than zero for the positive residual group (F-stat = 11.26, p = 0.0008). It appears that
abnormally long presentations actually lead to longer discussion periods. However, the
magnitude of the effect is significantly less than it is for the negative residual group (the
sum of the coefficients = 0.1886 vs. –0.4094 for the negative residual group).
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Nevertheless, it appears that when managers present for a longer duration than expected,
they are not necessarily presenting information that analysts want.34
Finally, the results of equation four are presented in the last three columns of Table 2.4.
The results are consistent with hypothesis three. The coefficient on
HI_ANAL×ABLNGTHPRES is significantly negative (t-stat = 2.64), indicating that the
negative relation between abnormal presentation length and discussion length is stronger
for firms with high analyst following.
As an alternative specification, we also ran equations two, three and four using the number
of questions asked by analysts (#QUESTION) as our dependent variable (untabulated).
The results are inferentially similar (all variables of interest are significant at similar
probability levels). The one exception is that the F-test on the sum of the coefficients
ABLNGTHPRES and POS×ABLNGTHPRES is not significant, indicating there is no relation
between discussion length and abnormal presentation length when presentations are
abnormally long (vs. the positive relation reported using LENGTHDISC as the dependent
variable). However, the coefficient on POS×ABLNGTHPRES is still significantly positive,
consistent with hypothesis two.
Overall, the evidence is consistent with analysts playing a significant role in determining
the information that is disclosed during conference calls and hence, in the incremental
informative nature of conference calls. Moreover, the results suggest that managers (on
average) respond to analysts’ inquiries by providing more information, rather than refusing
to answer their questions. These conclusions, however, assume that longer calls are a
reasonable proxy for more information — an issue we address in the next section.
34 This result also addresses the concern that our finding is the result of some conference calls being constrained
to a certain time limit (i.e. when managers’ presentations are abnormally long, discussion periods will, by
necessity, be cut short due to time constraints). It does not appear to be the case that abnormally long
presentations lead to short discussion periods. Rather, the overall negative relation between abnormal presentation
length and discussion length is driven by abnormally short presentations being followed by longer discussions
(which is less likely the result of time limits). As additional evidence that our findings are not the result of time
constraints, we also regressed discussion length on raw presentation length (not abnormal presentation length)
and we do not find a statistically significant negative coefficient on presentation length (results untabulated). In
other words, discussion lengths are longer not just when presentation are shorter but when presentations are
unexpectedly shorter given the circumstances of the firm (e.g., the firms reports bad news, surprising earnings,
special items, etc.).
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2.4.3 The relation between length and information
A key assumption of the previous analysis is that longer presentations and discussion
periods represent more information. However, it is possible that managers simply “talk a
lot” without revealing any relevant information. This possibility seems relatively unlikely,
particularly in a firm-fixed effects setting where cross-sectional variation in managerial
“verbosity” is controlled for.35 However, to provide some empirical evidence on this issue,
we examine the relation between call length and changes in attributes of analysts’ forecasts
before and after the call. We examine three changes in analysts’ forecasts of the
subsequent quarter’s earnings (quarter q+1):
x |FREV|  Absolute analyst forecast revisions, defined as the absolute value of the
difference between the median forecast of quarter q+1 issued before the
conference call and the median forecast issued after the conference call, divided
by price at the start of the call.
x 'FE  The change in analyst forecast accuracy, defined as (FEPOST  FEPRE)/Pstart,
where FEPOST (FEPRE ) is the absolute value of the difference between actual
earnings for quarter q+1 and the median forecast for quarter q+1 issued after
(before) the conference call and Pstart equals price at the start of the call.
x 'DISP – The change analyst dispersion defined as (DISPPOST  DISPPRE), where
DISPPOST (DISPPRE) is the standard deviation of forecasts issued for quarter q+1
after (before) the conference call, divided by the median forecast issued after
(before) the conference call.
For each analysis, our sample of forecasts includes only analysts who issue at least one
forecast for quarter q+1 in the 90 days prior and 90 days subsequent to the conference call
for quarter q. We then retain the last forecast issued prior and first forecast issued after the
call for each analyst. All forecast and actual data are obtained from the IBES unsplit-
adjusted detail file.
35 Alternatively, managers may actually use longer, more confusing sentence structures to convey less
information. For example, Li (2006) finds that managers’ disclosures in the MD&A section of the annual report
are longer and more difficult to read when a firm reports poor performance. He interprets his findings as
consistent with managers attempting to hide poor performance by providing unclear disclosures.
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We run the following three regressions, including firm-fixed effects and winsorising the
top and bottom 1% of both the dependent variable and the variable of interest —
LENGTHCC:
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(5)
If longer calls are more informative for analysts, we expect analysts to revise their
forecasts more, resulting in a positive coefficient on LENGTHCC. If longer conference
calls provide analysts with information that increases their forecast accuracy, we expect the
coefficient on LENGTHCC to be negative (because negative values of 'FE represent
increased forecast accuracy). Finally, if longer conference calls result in greater consensus
among analysts, we expect the coefficient on LENGTHCC to be negative.
Note that we include the full set of determinants of presentation length in our analysis here.
As a result, the coefficients on LENGTHCC capture the effect of abnormal conference call
length on analyst forecast revisions, accuracy and dispersion.36 Including these variables
helps ensure that our results are not driven by the effect of particular economic events that
may lead to longer conference calls and also to greater forecast revisions and accuracy. For
example, if a firm undergoes a restructuring, this event may be informative to the market
irrespective of any increases in conference call length. However, because this event is
likely to lead to increases in length, we would be at risk of concluding that longer calls are
more informative when, in fact, they are simply correlated with events that result in greater
accuracy or revisions. The downside of this approach, however, is that the impact of
expected levels of disclosures made as a result of unusual events is not captured by
LENGTHCC.
36 Including the determinants as control variables is equivalent to regressing LENGTHCC on these control
variables and including the residual of this regression as an independent variable in place of LENGTHCC in
equation (5). Thus, one can interpret the variable LENGTHCC as capturing the effect of abnormal or unexpected
conference call length on analyst forecast revisions, accuracy and dispersion.
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Results of our analysis are presented in Table 2.5, Panel A.37 We find that longer calls are
associated with greater absolute forecast revisions of next quarter’s earnings as well as
improvements in forecast accuracy (coefficient on LENGTHCC significant at p< 0.01 in
both the |FREV| and 'FE regressions). However, we do not find that longer calls are
associated with changes in forecast dispersion (coefficient on LENGTHCC in the 'DISP
regression is not statistically significant). To provide some sense of the magnitude of the
effect, we note that a change in LENGTHCC of 1840 words (the average within-firm inter-
quartile range for call length) results in a change in |FREV| of 0.01656 and change in 'FE
of –0.01582. The inter-quartile ranges for |FREV| and 'FE (untabulated) are 0.2383 and
0.2078 respectively. Thus, the changes in |FREV| and 'FE represent 6.9% and 7.6% of the
inter-quartile range respectively.
We focus on overall conference call length rather than the length of the presentation and
the discussion separately because changes in analyst forecasts before and after the call are
the result of both components. To truly test the informative nature of each component, we
would need analysts to revise their forecasts after the presentation and then again after the
discussion (which analyst do not do). However, to provide some evidence on this issue, we
replace LENGTHCC in our regressions with the two components of length: LENGTHPRES
and LENGTHDISC. Results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.5, Panel B. It appears
that the length of the discussion is more deeply related to revisions in forecasts and
increased forecast accuracy — the coefficient on LENGTHPRES in both the |FREV| and
'FE regressions are not significant while the coefficients on LENGTHDISC are both
significant at p< 0.01.
Overall, our results suggest that longer calls represent more information to analysts — they
revise their forecasts more when calls are longer and the revision improves their forecast
37 The difference in magnitude between LENGTHCC and the dependent variables results in coefficients that are
very small in magnitude. Therefore, we divide LENGTHCC by 1000 and multiple |FREV| and 'FE by 100.
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accuracy.38 Thus, the fact that analysts’ discussion periods are longer when managers’
presentations are abnormally short, suggests that analysts add to the information
environment by eliciting further disclosures by managers.
38 An alternative test would be to examine absolute price revisions and trading volume during the actual
presentation and discussion periods. Untabulated analyses of these effects indicate that longer presentations and
discussions are associated with greater absolute price revisions and increased trading volume. These results add
further support for our assumption that length is a reasonable proxy for more information.
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Table 2.5
Relation between call length and analyst forecast properties
Panel A: Effect of overall call length on forecast revisions, accuracy and dispersion
|FREV|41 'FE1 'DISP1
Variables42 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
LENGTHCC 0.0090 2.98 –0.0086 –2.73 0.0010 0.31
ROA –0.7802 –4.62 0.1617 0.91 0.0216 0.13
RETQTR –0.2327 –8.84 0.0810 2.93 0.0372 1.33
RETDAYB4 –0.8854 –10.04 0.6369 6.88 0.1114 1.18
MISS 0.0636 5.86 –0.0295 –2.59 0.0249 2.23
|RETQTR| 0.2216 5.53 0.1663 –3.95 –0.1060 –2.48
|RETDAYB4| 0.8574 6.87 –0.8786 –6.71 0.2892 2.15
|FE| 4.1729 12.34 –-3.4097 –9.56 0.1314 0.42
|SPITEM| –0.3814 –2.05 0.3332 1.71 –0.1361 –0.73
|DISCOP| 0.4483 0.68 –1.1374 –1.58 0.4426 –-0.57
(Continued on next page)
41 This results from firm-fixed effects regressions of absolute forecast revisions (|FREV|), change
in absolute forecast error ('FE) and change in forecast dispersion ('DISP) on conference call
length. The sample of forecasts includes only analysts who issue at least one forecast for quarter
q+1 in the 90 days prior and 90 days subsequent to the conference call for quarter q. For each
analyst, we retain the last forecast issued prior and first forecast issued after the call. |FREV| is
the absolute value of the difference between the median forecast issued prior to the call and the
median forecast issued after the call, divided by price at start of call. 'FE = (FEPOST 
FEPRE)/Price at start of call, where FEPOST (FEPRE ) is the absolute value of the difference between
actual earnings for quarter q+1 and the median forecast in our sample issued after (before) the
call. 'DISP = DISPPOST  DISPPRE, where DISPPOST (DISPPRE) is the standard deviation of
forecasts in our sample issued after (before) the call, divided by the median of forecasts issued
for quarter q+1 after (before) the call. Forecast and actual data are obtained from the IBES
unsplit-adjusted detail file. For presentation purposes, we divide LENGTHCC, LENGTHPRES and
LENGTHDISC by 1000 and multiple |FREV| and 'FE by 100.
42 See variable definitions on Table 3. QTR2, QTR3, and QTR4 are dummy variables equal to 1
if the call relates to fiscal quarter 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Y2004 and Y2005 are dummy variables
equal to 1 if the call is held in 2004 and 2005 respectively.
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(Panel A – Continued)
|FREV| 'FE 'DISP
Variables Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
M&APRES -4.8610 -1.73 1.0179 0.34 0.4953 0.17
RESTPRES 14.2792 2.65 -2.2694 -0.40 1.7340 0.31
'SALES -0.2894 -3.44 0.0884 1.00 -0.0214 -0.27
AF -0.0095 -3.60 0.0011 0.41 -0.0017 -0.66
LNASSETS 0.0683 2.38 -0.0459 -1.52 -0.0114 -0.37
QTR2 0.0214 1.95 -0.0257 -2.23 0.0124 1.13
QTR3 0.0485 4.26 -0.0223 -1.87 0.0006 0.06
QTR4 0.0285 2.41 -0.0015 -0.12 -0.0004 -0.03
Y2004 -0.0279 -2.55 0.0143 1.25 -0.0017 -0.15
Y2005 -0.0190 -1.48 0.0148 1.10 0.0148 1.12
Firm-Fixed Included Included Included
n=8,445, R2=0.56 n=8,413, R2=0.36 n=6,408 , R2=0.24
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Table 2.5 (continued)
Relation between call length and analyst forecast properties
Panel B: Effect of presentation/discussion length on forecast revisions, accuracy, and
dispersion
|FREV|43 'FE1 'DISP1
Variables44 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
LENGTHPRES 0.0091 1.33 –0.0017 –0.24 –0.0066 –0.98
LENGTHDISC 0.0090 2.75 –0.0099 –2.88 0.0014 0.41
ROA –0.7795 –4.62 0.1610 0.91 0.0227 0.13
RETQTR –-0.2329 –8.85 0.0817 2.96 0.0362 1.30
RETDAYB4 –0.8854 –10.04 0.6367 6.88 0.1089 1.16
MISS 0.0636 5.86 –0.0297 –2.61 0.0252 2.26
|RETQTR| 0.2216 5.53 –0.1661 –3.95 –0.1057 -2.47
|RETDAYB4| 0.8568 6.86 –0.8769 –6.70 0.2910 2.16
|FE| 4.1721 12.33 –3.4080 –9.56 0.1307 0.42
|SPITEM| -0.3814 -2.05 0.3318 1.70 -0.1337 -0.72
(Continued on next page)
43 This results from firm-fixed effects’ regressions of absolute forecast revisions (|FREV|), change
in absolute forecast error ('FE), and change in forecast dispersion ('DISP) on conference call
length. The sample of forecasts includes only analysts who issue at least one forecast for quarter
q+1 in the 90 days prior and 90 days subsequent to the call for quarter q. For each analyst, we retain
the last forecast issued prior and first forecast issued after the call. |FREV| is the absolute value of
the difference between the median forecast issued prior to the call and the median forecast issued
after the call, divided by price at start of call. 'FE = (FEPOST  FEPRE)/Price at start of call, where
FEPOST (FEPRE ) is the absolute value of the difference between actual earnings for quarter q+1 and
the median forecast in our sample issued after (before) the call. 'DISP = DISPPOST  DISPPRE,
where DISPPOST (DISPPRE) is the standard deviation of forecasts in our sample issued after (before)
the call, divided by the median of forecasts issued for quarter q+1 after (before) the call. Forecast
and actual data are obtained from the IBES unsplit-adjusted detail file. For presentation purposes,
we divide LENGTHCC, LENGTHPRES and LENGTHDISC by 1000 and multiple |FREV| and 'FE by
100.
44 See variable definitions on Table 3. QTR2, QTR3, and QTR4 are dummy variables equal to 1
if the call relates to fiscal quarters 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Y2004 and Y2005 are dummy
variables equal to 1 if the call is held in 2004 and 2005 respectively.
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(Panel B - Continued)  
|FREV| 'FE 'DISP
Variables Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
|DISCOP| 0.4482 0.68 -1.1321 -1.57 -0.4556 -0.59
M&APRES -4.8518 -1.72 0.9111 0.31 0.5788 0.20
RESTPRES 14.2775 2.65 -2.3638 -0.42 1.7927 0.32
'SALES -0.2895 -3.44 0.0887 1.00 -0.0214 -0.27
AF -0.0095 -3.58 0.0012 0.44 -0.0017 -0.67
LNASSETS 0.0682 2.37 -0.0463 -1.53 -0.0108 -0.35
QTR2 0.0214 1.94 -0.0265 -2.29 0.0131 1.20
QTR3 0.0485 4.25 -0.0231 -1.93 0.0015 0.13
QTR4 0.0284 2.37 -0.0041 -0.32 0.0027 0.21
Y2004 -0.0279 -2.55 0.0137 1.19 -0.0011 -0.10
Y2005 -0.0190 -1.49 0.0146 1.09 0.0150 1.13
Firm-fixed Effects Included Included Included
n=8,445, R2=0.56 n=8,413, R2=0.36 n=6,408 , R2=0.24
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2.5 Relation between presentation content and discussion period length
2.5.1 Measuring abnormal financial and forward-looking disclosures
Next, we consider the content of management’s presentations and the impact on discussion
periods. Similar to our prior analysis, we examine the relation between financial and
forward-looking disclosures by first modelling expected levels of these disclosures. There
is considerably less prior research on the determinants of different types of disclosures but
we suspect that many of the determinants of overall disclosure levels are also likely to be
related to the tendency to make financial and forward-looking disclosures. In particular, we
expect firm performance to be related to these types of disclosures because managers of
poorly performing firms are reticent to discuss both the past as well as the financial
performance of the company, leading to a positive relation between firm performance and
financial disclosures and a negative relation between performance and forward-looking
disclosures.
Thus, to measure abnormal financial and forward-looking disclosures, we capture the
residuals from the following regressions:
(6)
We again include year, fiscal quarter and firm dummies. The results of these regressions
are reported in Table 2.6. Consistent with our expectations, we find that firms report more
financial disclosures when performance during the quarter is good — the coefficient on
both ROA and RETQTR are significantly positive. We also find there is less financial
disclosures when firms miss analysts’ expectations (coefficient on MISS is significantly
negative). Financial disclosures are also greater when firms report special items and when
discussing restructuring activities during the presentation. Finally, financial disclosures
appear to be lowest during the first quarter and highest in the fourth fiscal quarter as the
coefficient on QTR2, QTR3, and QTR4 are all significantly positive, with QTR4 having a
larger coefficient than QTR2 and QTR3.
With respect to forward-looking disclosures, we find some evidence that managers discuss
the future more when performance is poor (coefficient on RETQTR is marginally
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significantly negative at p = 0.06) and when announcing bad news (coefficient on
RETDAYB4 is significantly negative at p = 0.002). Perhaps, managers would prefer to focus
on the future when past performance is poor. Managers also appear to focus on the future
more when absolute returns during the quarter and in the 24 hours prior to the call are
higher. Finally, forward-looking disclosures appear to be highest during the first fiscal
quarter of the year as the coefficients on QTR2, QTR3, and QTR4 are all significantly
negative.
Both models have reasonably good explanatory power (R2 = 77% for the %FINPRES
regression and R2 = 58% for the %FUTPRES regression).
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Table 2.6
Determinants of financial and forward-fooking disclosures
%FINPRES45 %FUTPRES1
Variable46 Pred Sign Coeff. t-stat p-value47 Pred Sign Coeff. t-stat p-value3
ROA  0.0088 3.17 0.001  -0.0019 -1.09 0.137
RETQTR  0.0007 1.70 0.045  -0.0004 -1.59 0.056
RETDAYB4  0.0009 0.67 0.253  -0.0026 -2.96 0.002
MISS  -0.0004 -2.08 0.019  0.0001 1.01 0.313
|RETQTR| ? -0.0006 -0.85 0.394 " 0.0011 2.79 0.005
|RETDAYB4| ? -0.0012 -0.61 0.544 ? 0.0021 1.68 0.093
|FE| ? 0.0019 0.62 0.538 ? 0.0005 0.27 0.786
|SPITEM| ? 0.0101 3.25 0.001 ? -0.0011 -0.56 0.573
|DISCOP| ? 0.0200 1.98 0.048 ? -0.0017 -0.26 0.792
M&APRES " 0.0004 0.71 0.475 " -0.0000 -0.22 0.822
RESTRUCTPRES " 0.0086 7.51 0.000 " 0.0011 1.52 0.127
'SALES " -0.0006 -0.43 0.668 " -0.0008 -0.95 0.342
AF ? -0.0001 -2.31 0.021 ? 0.0000 0.61 0.542
LNASSETS ? -0.0008 -1.69 0.092 ? 0.0001 0.36 0.723
QTR2 ? 0.0008 4.51 0.000 ? -0.0007 -6.33 0.000
QTR3 ? 0.0008 4.47 0.000 ? -0.0005 -4.37 0.000
QTR4 ? 0.0020 10.71 0.000 ? -0.0005 -4.24 0.000
Y2004 ? -0.0001 -0.75 0.452 ? -0.0000 -0.57 0.568
Y2005 ? -0.0007 -3.27 0.001 ? -0.0002 -1.87 0.062
Firm-Fixed Effects Included Included
N = 10,062, R2 = 0.77 N = 10,062, R2 = 0.58
45 Results from firm-fixed effects’ regressions of percentage of financial words in the presentation (%FINPRES)
and percentage of forward-looking words in the presentation (%FUTPRES).
46 See variable definitions on Table 3, Panel A. QTR2, QTR3, and QTR4 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the
conference call relates to fiscal quarter2, 3 and 4, respectively. Y2004 and Y2005 are dummy variables equal to 1
if the conference call is held in 2004 and 2005 respectively.
47 p-values are one-tailed for variables with directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise.
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2.6 The effect of abnormal financial and forward-looking disclosures on
discussion length
Hypothesis four posits that analysts will probe managers more during the discussion if they
provide unexpectedly low levels of financial and forward-looking disclosures. To test this
hypothesis, we run the following regressions:
0 1
DISC PRESLENGTH ABFINE E H   (7)
0 1
DISC PRESLENGTH ABFUTE E H   (8)
In both regressions, we expect the coefficient on E1 to be negative if analysts demand
financial and forward-looking information. In addition, one could argue (similar to our
prior analysis) that the relation is not symmetric — that analysts probe managers more
when they provide relatively little financial or forward-looking disclosures but providing
unexpectedly high levels of financial or forward-looking disclosures does not necessarily
reduce the length of the discussion. Thus, we also run the following regressions:
0 1 2 3
DISC PRES FIN FIN PRESLENGTH ABFIN POS POS ABFINE E E E H    u (9)
0 1 2 3
DISC PRES FUT FUT PRESLENGTH ABFUT POS POS ABFUTE E E E H    u (10)
Where POSFIN (POSFUT) is a dummy variable equal to one, ABFINPRES (ABFUTPRES) is
either positive or zero. We expect the coefficients on E3 to be positive if abnormally high
levels of financial or forward-looking disclosures do not lead to a reduction in discussion
length in the same way that abnormally low levels of these disclosures lead to longer
discussions.
The results of these analyses are presented in Table 2.7. Panel A reports the results of
equations (7) and (9). Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that when unexpected levels
of financial disclosures are lower, analysts’ discussion periods last longer. However, the
results are not asymmetric — the coefficient on the interaction variable, POSFIN ×
ABFINPRES, is not significant. Thus, abnormally low levels of financial disclosures lead to
longer discussions in the same way that abnormally high levels of financial disclosures
lead to shorter discussions.
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The results of equations (8) and (10) are presented in Panel B. Inconsistent with our
hypothesis, abnormally low levels of forward-looking disclosures do not lead to longer
discussions. In fact, results suggest the opposite — ABFUTPRES — is positively related to
discussion length. When we allow the coefficient on ABFUTPRES to vary for positive and
negative values, we do not find a significant incremental slope coefficient for positive
values of ABFUTPRES (coefficient on POSFUT × ABFUTPRES is not significant), but an
F-test on the combined coefficients on ABFUTPRES and the interaction term, is
significantly positive at p<0.01. Thus, the positive relation between ABFUTPRES and
discussion length is driven by positive values of ABFUTPRES. In other words, when
managers provide unexpectedly high levels of forward-looking disclosures, analysts appear
to probe them more in the discussion. One possibility is that forward-looking disclosures
are inherently less verifiable and, as a result, analysts require greater justification for these
statements.
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2.7 Conclusions
We examine the relation between information provided by managers in the presentation
portion of a conference call and the subsequent discussion with analysts later in the call.
We find that when managers provide abnormally low levels of disclosure during the
presentation portion of the call, analyst discussion periods are longer. However, it may not
be that abnormally high levels of disclosure in the presentation lead to shorter discussions.
In addition, the relation between low disclosure in the presentation and longer discussion
periods is stronger for firms with greater analyst following. These results suggest that
analysts play an active role in enriching the information environment by probing managers
more when they provide relatively little information.
One might argue that length is not necessarily indicative of greater information. We
provide evidence to suggest that, in general, more words spoken during calls do represent
more information. We find that longer calls are associated with greater absolute forecast
revisions and increased analyst forecast accuracy. The increased forecast accuracy, in
particular, is contrary to the assumption in Li (2006) that longer disclosures are actually
more “confusing”.
We also investigate whether certain types of disclosures during the presentation portion of
the call are related to reduced discussion periods. We find evidence that when there are
unexpectedly low levels of financial disclosures, analysts’ discussion periods are longer,
which suggest analysts demand financially focused disclosures. Contrary to our
expectations, however, discussion periods are not shorter when managers provide more
forward-looking disclosures. Rather, discussion periods appear longer after unexpectedly
high levels of forward-looking disclosures in the discussion portion.
Overall, our results suggest that one of the primary benefits of hosting a conference call —
as opposed to simply issuing an earnings press release — is that analysts are able to play
an active role in uncovering information about the firm, resulting in a richer information
environment.
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3 Disclosure of intangible asset information in conference calls50
3.1 Introduction
We investigate the volume and information content of intangible asset disclosures in
earnings conference calls. It is argued that intangible assets are the main drivers of wealth
and growth in the contemporary economy (Lev, 2001). However, current accounting
standards fail to reflect the value and performance of intangible assets in financial
statements (Guimón, 2005; Stolowy & Jeny-Cazavan, 2001; and Cañibano et al, 2000).
The current requirements of IFRS and US GAAP place significant limitations on the types
of intangible assets that are permitted to be recognised (i.e. capitalised) in published
financial statements. In addition, both IFRS and US GAAP specify only minimal
requirements for the disclosure of information about intangible assets that might
compensate for the limitations on recognition and measurement. As a result, several groups
and individuals have expressed their concern regarding the relevance of financial
statements and have called for greater disclosure of (non-financial) information about
intangible assets (see Maines et al, 2003, 2002).
As a response to these calls, the FASB and IASB have formulated several initiatives51 to
investigate whether increased mandated disclosure of intangible asset information is
50 This chapter is based on joint work with Gerard Mertens and Frank Verbeeten of Rotterdam School of
Management, Erasmus University. I appreciate comments from Douglas V. DeJong, Jeroen Suijs, and workshop
participants at the EAA Congress 2008, EIASM conference on Intangibles 2007 in Ferrara, University of
Amsterdam, Rotterdam School of Management Erasmus University.
51 FASB proposed a new agenda project in 2001, “Disclosure of Information about Intangible Assets not
Recognised in Financial Statements”. FASB removed the topic from its agenda in 2004 because it was of the
view that the project should be considered in the context of its plans for a coordinated agenda with the IASB. In
December 2007, the IASB decided not to add a project on intangible assets to its active agenda. Instead, the the
board expressed a desire that further research should be conducted until the board could consider it again for
addition to the active agenda.
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desirable. Opponents of increased disclosure requirements have expressed their concern
over the explicit disclosure requirements as it would restrict the flexibility of firms to
describe intangible assets (Business Roundtable, 2001). These opponents favour an
information environment that is based on voluntary disclosures rather than mandated
disclosures. Similarly, the IASB has noted that the benefits of additional disclosures should
be considered in light of user needs and implementation costs (IASB, 2007). Finally,
Maines et al. (2001) express the concern that the approach by the FASB and IASB
proceeds on the assumption that the current disclosure environment for intangibles is
suboptimal. However, Maines et al. (2001) argue that we know little about the validity of
this assumption.
In this paper, we address these issues by analysing disclosures about intangibles in the
existing disclosure environment. More specifically, we focus on the intangible asset
disclosures in the presentation and discussion portions of earnings conference calls.
Earnings conference calls provide companies with a (relatively) non-regulated opportunity
to disclose information about intangible assets to capital market participants. We
investigate whether these disclosures are relevant to investors and whether managers tailor
to the information, demands of capital market participants. We find that intangible asset
disclosures in conference calls have information content — in the sense that they
positively affect absolute returns during the presentation and discussion portions of the
call. Our results also suggest that disclosures are “sticky” information that is disclosed in a
conference call and is likely to be addressed in subsequent conference calls as well.
Finally, managers seem to learn from the questions that are asked in the discussion portion
of the conference call. When analysts ask questions about intangible assets in the
discussion portion of the call, management is more likely to include disclosures about
those intangible assets in the next conference call’s presentation. This result suggests that
managers use the interaction with capital markets to understand their information needs.
Jointly, our results suggest that information on intangible assets that is released through
conference calls is relevant to investors and that managers try to cater to the information
demands of capital market participants.
Our results contribute to the literature in several ways. First, according to our knowledge,
this is one of the first short-window studies on intangible asset disclosures. Studies on
short-window returns investigate whether a particular disclosure adds to the information
set available to investors (Holthausen & Watts, 2001). Second, few studies have examined
the disclosure of intangible asset in earnings conference calls. Matsumoto et al. (2009) find
that longer calls are more informative, while Brown et al. (2004) find that conference calls
reduce information asymmetry among equity investors. We add to these results by stating
that the intangible asset disclosures are a significant determinant of the informative nature
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of conference call. This suggests that the conference call (partially) compensates for a
(perceived) lack of disclosures about intangible assets in the earnings announcement or
other financial statements. Additionally, previous evidence (e.g. Bushee et al., 2003)
suggests that conference calls are “sticky”, i.e., firms that provide “open calls” stick to that
decision. Our findings suggest that the information provided in those conference calls is
also “sticky”, i.e., intangible asset information that is provided in previous calls is likely to
be discussed in subsequent calls. Finally, our evidence indicates that disclosures during the
discussion portion have information content. This suggests that management is uncertain
about the information needs of analysts in respect of intangible assets. In the additional
tests, we found evidence that is consistent with this notion.
The rest of this paper is divided into six sections. The next section describes the literature
regarding earnings conference calls. Section three describes the relevant literature in
respect of intangible assets. The fourth section develops our hypotheses. Section five
discusses the methodology of this paper and section six provides the empirical results,
while the last section offers the conclusions and limitations.
3.2 Earnings conference calls
Information about intangible assets may find its way to the markets through other ways
than mandated written disclosures. Many companies have been experimenting with new
ways of external communication in order to convey information on intangible assets not
presently incorporated in financial reports (cf. Bukh et al., 2005; and Bushee et al., 2003).
The alternatives vary from mass media communication (such as press releases) to
disclosure through investor relations meetings and conference calls (Bukh et al., 2005,
Kimbrough, 2005; García-Meca, 2005; and Bowen et al., 2002). Earnings conference calls
are large-scale telephone conference calls during which managers make presentations to,
and answer questions from various market participants, usually about (future) earnings
(Frankel et al., 1999). Following the introduction of Regulation Fair Disclosure, virtually
all conference calls are open to the general public, usually through a live webcast of the
call. The effect of conference calls on analysts and other market participants is an
important issue because, virtually, all US-listed firms now use conference calls to enhance
investors’ understanding of earnings announcements (Kimbrough, 2005). The National
Investor Relations Institute, for example, indicates that 92% of its members conduct
conference calls (NIRI, 2004, p. 49) — up from 82% in 1998 (Bowen et al, 2002).
Conference calls provide benefits to companies and market participants. From the analyst’s
perspective, conference calls provide the opportunity to listen to the questions of others,
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save time and money and provide more timely information to investors. From a company’s
perspective, conference calls save time and mitigate selective disclosure problems.
Conference calls have additional advantages over press releases. They are subject to a
lower standard of legal liability than statements made in a press release and are more
flexible in providing information in response to analysts’ questions (Frankel et al, 1999).
Earnings-related conference calls are often used to supplement the mandated disclosures
and are generally held within a few hours to a day following the issue of the earnings
announcement press release (cf. Frankel et al., 1999; and Kimbrough, 2005). An average
conference call includes an 18-minute presentation (Matsumoto et al., 2008) by
management, followed by a 28-minute question and answer session in which a moderator
assigns questions to the management team. The sponsoring company usually controls who
asks questions (Frankel et al., 1999; and Mayew, 2008).
Prior studies have established that conference calls are informative to market participants
in that they trigger unusually large trading and stock price responses (Bushee et al., 2003;
and Frankel et al., 1999) and help analysts form more accurate earnings expectations
(Bowen et al., 2002). However, till date, there has been little evidence that this trading
behaviour is a function of the intangible assets disclosures released during conference calls
(cf. Bushee et al., 2003). The findings by Kimbrough (2005) suggest that conference calls
result in more timely analyst and investor responses to the future implications of current
earnings surprises. Matsumoto et al. (2008) find that calls of longer duration are associated
with greater absolute forecast revisions and increased analyst forecast accuracy.
Previous research suggests that managers disclose at least some additional information on
intangible assets during conference calls. For example, Tasker (1998) notes that certain
types of information (for example, information regarding intangible assets) are difficult to
convey through traditional financial reporting channels and find strong support that firms
with less-informative financial statements (i.e., those with more intangible assets) are more
likely to host conference calls. Bushee et al. (2003) find that firms with higher intangible
assets are less likely to provide open calls, which is consistent with the idea that firms with
more complex financial disclosures target the information at more sophisticated market
participants. Jointly, these results suggest that firms use conference calls as an economic
and convenient medium to disclose information about intangible assets to market
participants.
Disclosure of Intangible Asset Information in Conference Calls
65
3.3 Intangible Assets
We define an intangible asset as a claim to future benefits that does not have a physical
(buildings and inventory) or financial (stocks and bonds) embodiment (Lev, 2001). Current
accounting standards fail to reflect the value and performance of intangible assets (Stolowy
& Jeny-Cazavan, 2001; and Cañibano et al., 2000). For example, SFAS 2 requires that
research and development costs be charged as expenses incurred. A less restrictive
recognition criteria applies to intangible assets (other than R&D) that are acquired in a
business combination. However, although SFAS 141 and SFAS 142 require that such
intangibles are initially measured at fair value (cf. Kimbrough, 2007), subsequent
measurement is based on cost less impairment for indefinite lived intangible assets and
amortised cost less impairment for finite live intangible assets and, therefore, largely fails
to capture the economic performance of intangibles. Therefore, much information about
intangible assets is excluded from the financial statements.
One way to increase information about intangible assets is to mandate a standard set of
disclosures related to intangible assets (Maines et al., 2001). However, the type of
disclosure that is relevant for stakeholders depends on the context (Maines et al., 2001).
Lambert (1998) also points out that several problems will arise if intangible asset
disclosures are mandated. First, most information on intangibles is “softer” than most
reported accounting measures. As a result, measures for intangibles are difficult to
standardise. Second, Lambert (1998) notes that a disclosure standard must provide
guidance on how to measure and present information on intangibles and whether the data
should be provided at the level of the firm or its geographic or business segments. Third,
empirical evidence (Kallapur & Kwan, 2004; and Mueller, 1999) suggests that managerial
incentives affect the measurement, recognition and disclosure of intangible asset
information (i.e., the reliability of intangible asset disclosures). Finally, there is little direct
evidence on the benefits and costs of intangible asset disclosures (Maines et al., 2003).
Various frameworks to classify intangible assets have been described in the literature.
Despite the differences in these frameworks, three major nexuses of intangibles are
commonly identified (Abdolmohammadi, 2005; Lev, 2001; Guthrie & Petty, 2000;
Brooking, 1996):
Structural or internal assets: These include innovation capital (intellectual capital,
proprietary processes, research and development) and infrastructure assets (corporate
culture and information technology). We distinguish between intellectual property assets
and infrastructure assets as the first category refers to explorative activities of the
organisation, while the second refers to the exploitative activities of the organisation..
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Relational or external assets: These include brands, customer or supplier relations and
strategic partners. Some of these can be considered to be proprietary, but only in a
temporal sense and, even then, not with any degree of confidence as they tend to change
over time. In addition, a company cannot control and/or change the behaviour of customers
or suppliers if they are not compliant with company objectives. Human capital assets:
These include personnel and compensation policies that create specific cultures and/or
competences. They refer to the individual’s education, skills, training, values, experiences,
and so forth. These assets cannot be owned by an organisation. However, from a value-
based perspective, they should be measured and managed as one cannot envisage an
organisation without employees.
Several studies have investigated the value-relevance of intangible asset disclosures (see
Wyatt, 2008; Ashton, 2005; Maines et al., 2003, 2001; Lev, 2001; Holthausen & Watts,
2001; Barth et al., 2001a; and Canibano et al., 2000, for reviews). Some recent studies
have looked at the value relevance of intangible asset disclosures in general (see Dumay &
Tull, 2007; Abdolmohammadi et al., 2006; Ritter & Wells, 2006; Goodwin & Ahmed,
2006; Liang & Yao, 2005; Han & Manry, 2004; and Rittter & Wells, 2006). Others have
focused on the value-relevance of specific intangible assets, such as structural assets (cf.
Liu, 2006; Ahmed & Falk, 2006; Callen & Morel, 2005; Gu & Lev, 2004; and Dehning et
al., 2003), relational assets (cf. Kallapur & Kwan, 2004; Mizik & Jacobson, 2006;
Rajgopal et al., 2003; Kohlbeck, 2004; and Riley et al., 2003) and, to a much lesser extent,
human capital (see Bell et al., 2002; Abdel-khalik, 2003; and Lajili & Zeghal, 2006, 2005).
Most of these studies suggest that intangible asset disclosures are value-relevant for
investors.
However, other recent studies have found insignificant or negative associations between
structural assets and market value. In a sample of 197 French firms, Cazavan-Jeny and
Jeanjean (2006) found that capitalised R&D is negatively associated with stock prices and
returns. They note that one of the reasons for this result could be that investors believe that
firms manage earnings by capitalising R&D. In addition, Shi (2003) notes that, from the
point of view of creditors, the adverse effect by the high volatility and uncertainty (the
variance effect) of the firm’s R&D activities outweigh, on average, the favourable impact
of the firm’s value increments (the mean effect). In a sample of 132 US firms, Shi (2003)
finds that, for creditors, R&D expenditures reflect less asset-like characteristics but more
risk attributes. Finally, Callen & Morel (2005) indicate that the seemingly ubiquitous
finding that R&D is value-relevant may depend upon the econometric approach taken and
the underlying valuation model.
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Summarising, while most studies find a positive relation between structural assets (R&D,
patents), relational assets (brands) and human capital assets on one hand and the market
value of firms on the other hand, this relation may be affected by managerial incentives,
industry structures, the perspective of the market party involved and the econometric
methods used to estimate the relation. We extend previous research in two directions. First,
we use a short-window event study. Relative to the long-horizon performance studies,
short-window event studies provide limited data and/or risk estimation problems which
should provide more confidence in the results (cf. Kothari, 2001, p. 192). In addition,
previous literature has generally focused on earnings announcements or 10K-releases. We
extend these studies by focusing on the incremental effects of intangible asset disclosures
in conference calls after the earnings announcement.
3.4 Hypotheses development
A typical conference call includes a review of the recently completed quarter by
management (which provides more colour to the press release) followed by a discussion
portion with analysts. In both the presentation and discussion portion, information not
contained in the press release may be disclosed (Kimbrough, 2005). For example, Frankel
et al (1999) suggest that managers are more likely to make forward-looking statements
during conference calls than to include them in the press release. Prior literature also
suggests that earnings conference calls are useful to managers and market participants
since they provide the opportunity to release information about intangible assets (see
Tasker, 1998; Frankel et al, 1999). Matsumoto et al (2008) find evidence that longer calls
are more informative.
Frankel et al (1999) find that conference calls provide information that is relevant to
market parties; i.e., they find unusually large return volatility and trading volume during
conference calls. In addition, they find that average trade size increases during conference
calls, suggesting that larger investors trade in real time on the basis of information that is
released during conference calls (see also Bushee et al, 2003). Frankel et al (1999) indicate
that this evidence implies that conference calls provide value-relevant information. In
addition, Brown et al (2004) find that conference calls reduce information asymmetry
among investors and suggest that firms provide forward-looking information in conference
calls. Therefore, we expect that the intangible asset disclosures that are released at any
time during earnings conference calls provide new information to investors. Our first set of
hypotheses relates to the information content of the presentation portion and discussion
portion of the conference call:
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H1a: Intangible asset disclosures provided during the presentation portion of
the earnings conference call have information content.
H1b: Intangible asset disclosures provided during the discussion portion of the
earnings conference call have information content.
If intangible asset disclosures in the discussion portion of the conference call have
information content, the question arises why management did not provide this information
earlier, for example, in the earnings announcement or in the presentation part of the call,
instead of providing it in response to questions of analysts on the conference call. One
potential reason is that management is unaware of the information needs of analysts; for
example, Frankel et al (1999) indicate that managers may use conference calls when they
are unsure of the information needs of investors. If managers use conference calls to learn
about the information needs of investors, it is likely that – once they learn about these
information needs – they will provide the requested information in subsequent conference
calls. This suggests that the information provided in conference calls is “sticky”; once
specific information has been provided in a conference call, it is likely that it will also be
provided in subsequent conference calls.
Other studies on voluntary disclosure practices of firms provide mixed evidence on the
‘“stickiness” of voluntary disclosures. For example, Healy et al. (1999) identify a fairly
large sample of firms whose AIMR scores have increased substantially, suggesting that
firms provide more information over time. However, Hutton et al. (2003) find that among
the 46 firms that issued earnings guidance multiple times during 1993–97, only 5 firms
have consistently accompanied the earnings guidance with verifiable forward-looking
information. Thus, they conclude that the practice is not “sticky”.
Given the mixed evidence on various types of voluntary disclosures, we examine the
extent to which a firm’s practice of providing disaggregated earnings guidance is “sticky”.
We focus on two issues: (a) are intangible asset disclosures in conference calls “sticky”
and (b) do managers learn about the information needs of investors through the
Q&Asession during a conference call. If we assume that conference calls are used to
identify the information needs of investors, it is likely that organisations will consistently
disclose intangible asset information in the subsequent conference calls. This leads to our
second hypothesis:
H2: Management consistently discloses intangible asset information in the
presentation portion of the conference call.
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Finally, the discussion portion of a conference call provides analysts the opportunity to ask
questions about issues regarding the company. The relatively unstructured nature of
conference calls, with opportunities to engage in discussions with market parties to
respond to specific information needs (cf. Frankel et al, 1999), suggests that flexibility
(and relevance) may be an important characteristic of conference calls. This suggests that
when managers become aware of the information needs of analysts in the discussion
portion of a conference call, it is likely that they will address this issue in the presentation
portion of the next conference call. This leads to our third hypothesis:
H3: Management uses the discussion portion of the conference call to learn
about the intangible asset disclosures required by analysts.
3.5 Methodology
3.5.1 Sample selection
We start our sample selection process by identifying announcements of earnings-related
conference calls (via the Dow Jones Calendar of Corporate Events) held during trading
hours (calls which are made between 9:30 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. EST52) by NYSE/NASDAQ
firms between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2005. We limit our sample to calls held
during trading hours because we include a market-based measure of news in the earnings
announcement as an independent variable and because we use intra-day market reactions
to the call as a proxy for information content. This process yields 19,043 potential
conference calls. We lose 4,853 observations due to missing Compustat data (including
firms not listed in the US). We lose another 101 observations due to missing CRSP data.
Subsequently, we gather transcripts of calls from Voxant FD wire, available through
Factiva. We are unable to find transcripts for 3,146 calls. We lose 133 calls because we
require Trade and Quote (TAQ) data during the minutes of the call and 41 observations
due to missing I/B/E/S analyst forecast data. We lose another 1,177 observations by
removing outliers (at 1% level) in dependent and independent variables. Our final sample
for industry-fixed effects tests includes 9,592 firm-quarters. For our firm-fixed effects
tests, we require at least four conference calls per firm, due to which we lose 1,099
52 We allow 1.5 hours for the call to complete. Hence, we end hour window 1.5 hours before the market closes at
4:00 p.m. i.e. at 2:30 p.m. Matsumoto et al. (2009) provide evidence that the vast majority of calls are completed
within 1.5 hours.
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observations. Our final sample for firm-fixed effects tests includes 8,493 observations.
Table 3.1, Panel A details our sample selection process.
Disclosure of Intangible Asset Information in Conference Calls
71
Table 3.1
Sample selection and descriptive data
Panel A: Sample attrition
Earnings-related conference calls held during trading hours 19,043
Missing data on Compustat (4,853)
Missing data on CRSP (101)
Transcript not available on Voxant FD wire (3,146)
Missing data on TAQ or stock price<$1 (133)
Missing data on I/B/E/S (41)
Outliers in dependent and independent variables (1%) (1,177)
Final sample for industry-fixed effects tests 9,592
Less than four conference calls per firm (1,099)
Final sample for firm-fixed effects tests 8,493
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No. % % of
of Obs. of Obs Population
Manufacturing 3441 35.87 34.11
Finance and Insurance 1893 19.74 28.09
Information 599 6.24 10.37
Retail Trade 557 5.81 3.96
Mining 449 4.68 3.12
Utilities 358 3.73 2.26
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 349 3.64 4.16
Transportation and Warehousing 336 3.50 2.36
Wholesale Retail 319 3.33 2.58
Administrative and Support, Waste Management
and Remediation Services 253 2.64 1.75
Accomodation and Food Services 245 2.55 1.67
Health Care and Social Assistance 212 2.21 1.41
Construction 195 2.03 1.02
Real estate and Leasing 137 1.43 1.51
Other Services 81 0.84 0.38
Art, Entertainment and Recreation 76 0.79 0.42
Educational Services 67 0.70 0.31
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 13 0.14 0.31
Unclassified Establishments 12 0.13 0.21
9592 100 100
Table 3.1 (Continued)
Sample selection and descriptive data
Panel B: Distribution of observations across industry5354
Panel B of Table 3.1 presents the distribution of our sample across industries, using the
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). We also report the percentage of
the population of NYSE and NASDAQ firms comprising each industry classification. Our
sample spans a wide range of industries and, in general, reflects the general distribution of
industries in the population. The one exception is the Finance and Insurance industry,
which comprises only 20% of our sample but comprises 28% of the population of
NYSE/NASDAQ firms.
53 NAICS stands for North American Industry Classification System
54 % of Population is the percent of firms on the NYSE and NASDAQ in each NAICS industry classification.
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3.5.2 Variables
3.5.2.1 Dependent variables
We use absolute returns to test our first and third hypothesis regarding the information
content of intangible asset disclosures (cf. Bushee et al, 2003; Frankel et al, 1999).
Holthausen & Verrecchia (1990) demonstrate that unexpected return variance and trading
volume are equally valid measures of information content (defined as a signal that alters
investors’ beliefs); that is, each metric can be used to assess the information content of
intangible asset disclosures in earnings conference calls (Frankel et al, 1999). To determine
the length of the presentation and discussion in minutes, we use a subsample of 1,263
conference calls (conducted between January and March 2005) for which we have exact
start and end times of each segment of the call. We match these start and end times to our
conference call transcripts and calculate the number of words spoken per minute for the
presentation and discussion portion of the call. We determine that the median number of
words spoken per minute (160 and 157 for the presentation and discussion portions of the
call respectively) and use these amounts to compute the approximate length, in minutes, of
the presentation and discussion portions of the call. We use TAQ data to determine the
absolute returns over these windows. Our measure for absolute returns, |RETPRES|
(|RETDISC|), is defined as the absolute returns during the presentation (discussion) portion
of the call.
Specifically, |RETPRES| (|RETDISC|) equals the absolute value of the difference between
the quote midpoint at the start of the presentation (discussion) and the quote midpoint at
the end of the presentation (discussion), divided by the quote midpoint at the start of the
presentation (discussion). The start of the presentation is assumed to be 116 seconds after
the scheduled start time of the conference call, which is the average time spent on the
introduction to the conference call (based on our subsample of 1,263 calls with exact start
and end times). The end of the presentation period is determined on the basis of the
number of words in the presentation and the median number of words spoken per second,
based on our subsample of conference calls with start and end times. The beginning of the
discussion is assumed to start 28 seconds after the end of the presentation, which is the
average time between the end of the presentation and the start of the discussion based on
our subsample (generally for instructions by the operator). The end of the discussion
period is similarly determined on the basis of the number of words in the discussion.
Our second and third hypotheses provide evidence on how management deals with the
(perceived) information needs of analysts. We test our second hypothesis by evaluating
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whether intangible assets disclosures in one conference call are followed by similar
disclosures in subsequent conference calls. To test this hypothesis, we construct indicator
variables that provide evidence on the disclosure about each class of intangible assets
(INNOV, INFRASTR, EXTERNAL and HUMAN) in the previous two calls as well as the
current conference call. Finally, we investigate whether managerial disclosures about an
intangible asset aspect in the presentation are driven by analyst’s questions in the previous
conference calls. In other words, do managers learn from analysts’ questions? To test this
hypothesis, we construct indicator variables (FIRSTINNOV, FIRSTINFRASTR,
FIRSTEXTERNAL, FIRSTHUMAN) that take on a value of 1 if the current call includes
a disclosure about the intangible asset aspect, while in the two prior conference calls no
disclosures about the intangible asset aspect were provided in the presentation, and takes
on a value of 0 otherwise. Our indicator variables refer to the (presumably) first disclosure
of information on this specific intangible asset aspect.
3.5.2.2 Independent variables
Our independent variables regarding types of intangible asset disclosures are based on
content analysis of the conference calls transcripts. Content analysis has been used widely
to investigate the release of intangible asset disclosures in annual reports (e.g. Francis et al,
2008; Abdolmohammadi, 2005; Guthrie et al, 2006; Guthrie et al, 2004), IPO-prospectuses
(Bukh et al, 2005) and presentations of companies to analysts (Garcia-Meca, 2005; Garcia-
Meca & Martinez, 2005). We use the framework developed by Abdolmohammadi (2005)
in order to investigate our hypothesis with respect to the type of intangible assets. Table
3.2 Panel A lists the components in Abdolmohammadi’s framework (2005) while Table
3.2 Panel B presents some examples of specific intangible asset disclosures in both the
presentation and discussion section of a conference call.
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Table 3.2
Intangible asset components
Panel A: Intangible asset framework (based on Abdolmohammadi, 2005)
Aspect Category Explanation Components
Infrastructure
capital
Corporate
culture
Components that facilitate
a creative/productive
workplace
Corporate culture, Management
philosophy, Leadership and
Communication
Information
technology
All relate to the
hardware/software of
information management
Information technology, Network,
Computer software, Operating
systems, Electronic data
interchange, Telecommunication
and Infrastructure
Innovation
capital
Intellectual
property
Defined and protected
assets
Intellectual property, Patents,
Copyright, Soft assets, Intangibles,
Licensing agreement and
Franchising agreement
Proprietary
process
Better ways of delivering
goods and services
Innovation, Innovative, Proprietary
process, Trade secrets,
Methodologies and Value added
R&D Ongoing search for new
products or services
R&D
External
capital
Brand Company brand name/logo Brand, Brand recognition, Brand
development, Goodwill and
Trademark
Customer
base
Acquiring and maintaining
a customer base
Customer satisfaction, Customer
recognition, Customer loyalty,
Customer base, Customer retention,
Customer service, Customer
support and Market share
Partnership Working arrangements with
other entities that produce
something which neither
entity could produce
Partnership and joint venture
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individually
Human
capital
Competence Qualities possessed by
employees
Intelligence, Knowledge, Know-
how, Education, Competence,
Motivation, Expertise, Intangible
skills, Brain power, Specialist and
Training
Personnel Specific policies that help
retain qualified employees
Human resource, Employee
satisfaction, Personnel, Employee
retention, Flextime,
Telecommuting and Empowerment
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Table 3.2 (Continued)
Intangible asset components
Panel B: Examples of intangible asset disclosures in conference calls
Aspect Presentation/
discussion
Example
Internal
capital
Presentation P15507:
JOE HARNETT, VICE PRESIDENT AND ACTING CHIEF FINANCIAL
OFFICER, MERCURY COMPUTER SYSTEMS:
‘…The electronics group. In total we have modeled the defense electronics
group to grow flat to 5% on the top lines next year. However, within this
segment, there are certain program tradeoff that is we anticipate. While certain
programs are expected to grow significantly, others will likely offset. We will
continue to monitor ordering patents….’
Discussion D33522:
JIM RICCHIUTI: ... And then on the SG&A line, despite the very strong
sequential growth in revenues, your SG&A was only up modestly. I was just
wondering if there is something in there that perhaps may be a little over legal
expense or just what are some of the issues that are driving the SG&A?
PAUL STEPHENSON: I'll let Jeff comment on the legal side in a minute but I
think our SG&A numbers in terms of comparing one quarter to another
typically have been affected by timing of trade shows, timing of the level of
other advertising we're doing. We have been hiring in that area particularly on
the sales side, so the compensation is going up. I guess just broadly I would say
those are the main pieces. Jeff, do you want to speak a little bit on the legal
side?
JEFF UPIN: Yes. I think that the legal basically represents a combination of a
couple of factors. One is as Gary mentioned, we continue to aggressively
patent and try to capture our innovation in patentable form. And as our
portfolio grows and as we file some of these patents internationally, those fees
just tend to go up and some of the international filings tend to get very
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expensive.
External
capital
Presentation P17202:
JIM ORR, CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT, CEO, CONVERGYS:
Our Information Management Group also announced an alliance with Visage
Mobile during the quarter. Visage Mobile is a mobile virtual network enabler,
providing operations and billing support systems to wireless service providers
that utilize and establish carriers' network to deliver differentiated wireless
services under their own brand name. Visage selected Geneva for their billing
platform because Geneva is widely recognized for its operational reliability
and will allow private-label wireless providers to launch their new wireless
offerings quickly and cost effectively.
Discussion D12127:
JEFFREY OMOHUNDRO, ANALYST, WACHOVIA SECURITIES: Hi, I
would echo those comments of Mark, but my question is on the proprietary
brand growth and the continuing acceleration there. I wonder if you can get
into a little bit, and maybe let us know what efforts you are pursuing to drive
the control brands, are you seeing an acceleration in new products or increased
emphasis by your sales people, maybe elaborate a little bit on that.
MICHAEL GRAY: A little bit of all of these, Jeff. We have continued line
expansions under the brands we have already introduced. We have introduced
a new line of bakery products under control brands, we intend to roll out a line
of spices this year, some beverages, a new line of value added seafood
products. So, we are continuing to roll out new brands and we are promoting
very heavily with our sales force and that may be over the last year, we got
everybody converted to a higher commission rate on selling our brands. So, we
are experiencing really good customer acceptance and our people are very sold
on our brand concept and are pushing it strongly with our customers, and we
got all the incentives in place to continue to drive that.
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Human
capital
Presentation P4753;
CHAD FITZHUGH, CFO, SECRETARY, TREASURER, O'CHARLEY'S
INC:
On the labor front, we experienced higher bonus expense, payroll taxes and
hourly labor costs that were offset by overall lower employee benefit costs.
Hourly labor rates increased approximately 2-3% for the quarter. Contributing
to the favourable employee benefit cost was a reduction in hourly insurance
costs, partially offset by increase in workers' compensation expense. We expect
that labor and benefits as a percentage of revenue will be flat to slightly up
sequentially in the third quarter. In the restaurant operating cost category for
the quarter, lower supervisory costs were offset by higher store occupancy
costs. Supervisory expenses were favourable, due to lower compensation and
management training expenses.
Discussion D4050:
ALAIN KARAOGLAN, ANALYST, DEUTSCHE BANK: Thank you for
having this call; it is very helpful. The question that I have regards the
insurance business. Jeff and Roger, we are facing a softening property casualty
environment and therefore pressure on revenues. How do you see -- what are
you doing in order to grow that business? You had spoken in the past about the
middle market opportunity about German and Japan. What are we going to do
to grow the revenue lines? Obviously there is some margin expansion that may
continue due to the efficiencies. But that can't continue forever even though
you have -- may become more efficient. So what are the opportunities on a
revenue side in order for the revenue to not to start going down at some point?
JEFF GREENBERG: We have a number of opportunities and they fall into
essentially 3 broad categories. One is the continued growth in our geographic
presence around the world. You mentioned Germany and Japan and we've
talked about them before but the list is a much longer one. We continue to
show attractive growth across geographies in the major countries and a long
way to go there.
Second is even in this country in a number of segments of client -- by client
size principally, we have very attractive opportunities to grow. The middle
market being one and we continue to show good gains there. Our market share
in the middle market we think is still in the single digits and so a long way to
go.
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Then third, is that with this set of client relationships around the world and
certainly growing by size, our ability to offer expanded services to clients is
enormous and we are working very hard to continue to add to that array of
services that we can offer our clients and training our people to be able to offer
those services. There are a number of dimensions that are available to us to
grow our top line and we are pursuing each one of them.
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To measure the independent variables for our first hypothesis, we split the transcripts into
the presentation and discussion portion of the call by searching for the first occurrence of
the word "operator" after the first 1,500 characters of the transcript. We have checked
whether the transcripts were split appropriately by searching the first 400 characters of the
discussion for key words or phrases that are typically associated with the start of the
discussion – for example, "instructions", "question-and-answer", "the floor is now open",
"at this time". For discussion, transcripts that did not include any of the key words, we
performed the split manually. In addition, each transcript includes a legal disclaimer at the
end of the document; we removed this disclaimer from all transcripts.
We measure intangible asset disclosures by determining whether words related to each of
the components are mentioned during the presentation portion or discussion portion
respectively. We create indicator variables for each component of intangible assets, which
take on a value of 1 if words related to the component are used in the section. As such, our
intangible assets disclosure measure is a measure that intends to capture whether a specific
intangible asset component is discussed in the conference call.
Table 3.3 presents the percentage of calls that include disclosures on intangible assets.
Some interesting observations emerge from this table. First of all, disclosures of intangible
assets in conference calls appear to be pervasive; about 81% of the presentations and about
79% of the discussions include words that are associated with intangibles. Furthermore, it
appears that infrastructure capital, innovation capital, external capital and human capital
are each discussed in a substantial proportion of the conference call presentations (between
30–50%) and discussions (between 12–45%). These results suggest that disclosures about
intangible assets are an important aspect of the content of earnings conference calls.
Additional analysis of the conference call transcripts (non-tabulated) suggests that
intangible asset disclosures are quite important relative to other issues discussed in
conference calls. Finally, the length of the conference call (which has been found to be
associated with the informative nature; see Matsumoto et al, 2008) is positively related to
intangible asset disclosures for all aspects.
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Table 3.3
Percentage of calls that include intangibles disclosures
Presentation Discussion
Infrastructure Capital 50.3% 42.7%
Innovation Capital 30.0% 11.6%
External Capital 45.4% 43.2%
Human Capital 38.8% 44.9%
All Intangibles 80.8% 79.3%
For our tests of hypothesis 2, we derive indicator variables (INNOVPLAG,
INFRASTRPLAG, EXTERNALPLAG and HUMANPLAG) that take a value of 1 for the
occurrence of intangible asset disclosures with respect to an intangibles aspect in the
presentation part of the previous conference call and 0 otherwise. Finally, in our test for
our third hypothesis, we include indicator variables (INNOVDLAG, INFRASTRDLAG,
EXTERNALD and HUMAND) that take a value of 1 for the occurrence of intangible asset
disclosures with respect to an intangibles aspect in the discussion part of the previous
conference call and 0 otherwise.
3.5.2.3 Control variables
To test our first hypothesis, we use industry-fixed effects regressions, which control for
industry-specific factors that likely influence the length and type of disclosures made
during calls. Industry membership is based on two-digit codes of the North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS). Our other regressions use firm-fixed effects.
In all our tests of the hypotheses, we control for the effects of size by including sales and
the natural logarithm of total assets (cf. Bowen et al, 2002; Tasker, 1998). Size is generally
considered a proxy for the richness of the firm’s information environment. In addition, we
control for the effects of analyst following and growth prospects by using the number of
estimates and the market-to-book ratio respectively as at the end of the quarter as control
variables (cf. Barth et al, 2001b; Tasker, 1998); also, we include quarter- and year-
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dummies to correct for time effects. In all our regressions, outliers are removed at the
1%level.
In testing hypotheses 1a and 1b, we control for the absolute return in the 24 hours before
the call to correct for “momentum effects” (i.e. movements of share prices due to
information provided in the press release). In addition, we control for the effects of
absolute forecast error since Brown et al (2002) suggest that forecast error is a proxy for
cross-sectional differences in the firm’s information environment. In hypothesis 1b, we
additionally control for the absolute return during the presentation portion of the call to
control for the possibility that news in the presentation spills over to the discussion.
Since the stock market’s response to the conference call may be associated with the
accounting performance over the quarter and the stock performance over the period
preceding the call, we include return on assets (ROA) and the equally weighted abnormal
return over the 90 calendar days preceding the call (RETEW) as control variables in our
regressions for H1a and H1b.
3.6 Empirical tests
3.6.1 Information content of intangible asset disclosures
We investigate whether the intangible asset disclosures in conference calls are value-
relevant to market participants. In other words, we investigate whether the information
provided in the presentation and discussion portion of the conference call is relevant to
investors. To test H1a and H1b, we run the following models:
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We use industry-fixed effects. Further, since we have multiple observations for each firm,
we report clustered standard errors.55 Table 3.4 provides our results.
55 Results from tests with unclustered standard errors are inferentially the same.
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Predicted Parameter Standard
Sign Estimate Error t-value p-value
INFRAP + 0.0006276 0.00014286 4.39 <.0001
INNOVP + 0.0005961 0.00019283 3.09 0.0010
EXTERNALP + 0.0005682 0.00014661 3.88 <.0001
HUMANP + 0.0005019 0.00015305 3.28 0.0006
ABSRETURNBF ? 0.0340435 0.00275342 12.36 <.0001
ABSFERROR ? 0.0149354 0.01190585 1.25 0.2098
RETEW ? -0.0001967 0.00056012 -0.35 0.7255
ROA ? -0.0158947 0.00400747 -3.97 <.0001
LNASSETS ? -0.001871 0.00051168 -3.66 0.0003
MB ? 0.0000339 0.00003685 0.92 0.3572
NUMEST ? 0.0000761 0.00002018 3.77 0.0002
QTR2 ? -0.0002477 0.00017264 -1.43 0.1515
QTR3 ? -0.0003329 0.00017286 -1.93 0.0543
QTR4 ? 0.0001467 0.00018154 0.81 0.4193
Y2003 ? -0.0002142 0.00016643 -1.29 0.1982
Y2004 ? 0.0003588 0.00015094 2.38 0.0176
Industry fixed effects Included
Table 3.4
Relevance of intangible asset disclosures
Panel A: Absolute return presentation56
56 Results from a industry fixed-effects regression of absolute returns (|RETPRES|) on indicator variables for the
occurrence of words related to intangible asset components in the presentation (one if words occur, zero
otherwise). |RETPRES| equals the absolute value of the difference between the quote midpoint at the start of the
presentation and the quote midpoint at the end of the presentation, divided by the quote midpoint at the start of
the presentation. INFRAP, INNOVP, EXTERNALP, HUMANP are indicator variables for the occurrence of
words related to internal capital, external capital and human capital in the presentation part of the conference call
(one if words occur, zero otherwise). |RETURNBF| is the absolute value of the return over the 24 hours prior to
the call (TAQ). |FERROR| is the absolute value of the EPS less the mean forecast EPS (I/B/E/S), divided by
price, ignoring stale forecasts. LNASSETS is the natural logarithm of total assets (Compustat quarterly item 44).
MB is market-to-book. NUMEST is the number of analysts who issued an EPS forecast for the current quarter
(from IBES summary file). QTR2, QTR3 and QTR4 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the conference call relates
to fiscal quarters 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Y2004 and Y2005 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the conference call
is held in 2004 and 2005 respectively.
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Predicted Parameter Standard
Sign Estimate Error t-value p-value
INFRAD + 0.0006549 0.00017488 3.75 0.0001
INNOVD + 0.0007756 0.0002845 2.73 0.0033
externalD + 0.0003063 0.0001624 1.89 0.0298
humanD + 0.0009308 0.00016756 5.55 <.0001
absreturnP ? 0.2106302 0.01546482 13.62 <.0001
absreturnbf ? 0.0358274 0.00318812 11.24 <.0001
absferror ? 0.031864 0.01349222 2.36 0.0183
retew ? 0.0000261 0.00069392 0.04 0.9700
ROA ? -0.007624 0.00429441 -1.78 0.0760
lnassets ? -0.0023482 0.00057592 -4.08 <.0001
MB ? 0.0000526 0.00003895 1.35 0.1768
NUMEST ? 0.0001445 0.00002336 6.19 <.0001
qtr2 ? 0.0001183 0.00019729 0.6 0.5489
qtr3 ? 0.000133 0.00021791 0.61 0.5418
qtr4 ? 0.0001393 0.00021052 0.66 0.5083
y2003 ? -0.0001508 0.00019518 -0.77 0.4399
y2004 ? -0.0001941 0.00017931 -1.08 0.2791
Industry fixed effects Included
Panel B: Absolute return discussion57
57 Results from an industry fixed-effects regression of absolute returns (|RETDISC|) on indicator variables for the
occurrence of words related to intangible asset components (one if words occur, zero otherwise) in the discussion.
See variable definitions on Panel A, INFRAD, INNOVD, EXTERNALD and HUMAND are indicator variables
for the occurrence of words related to infrastructure capital, innovation capital, external capital and human capital
in the discussion part of the conference call (one if words occur, zero otherwise).
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The results in Panel A indicate that disclosures in the presentation regarding infrastructure
capital intangible assets, innovation capital intangible assets, external capital intangible
assets and human capital intangible assets all have information content. From this, we infer
that voluntary disclosures by management with respect to these intangible assets may
(partially) compensate for insufficient disclosures in the earnings announcement,
management forecasts, press releases or financial statements. In other words, managers
appear to use the presentation portion of the conference call to provide information on
intangible assets. In addition, this information is relevant to capital market participants.
Panel B presents the information content of intangible asset disclosures in the discussion
portion of the call. The results are similar to those in Panel A, except that external capital
intangible assets are notably less significant (p<0.03).These results indicate that although
management provides information about intangible assets in the presentation portion of the
call, these disclosures are not sufficient to satisfy the information needs of analysts. As a
consequence, management provides (probably additional) disclosures about these
intangible assets in response to analyst questions.
3.6.2 Are disclosures “sticky”?
The fact that conference calls may be used to identify information needs of analysts (cf.
Frankel et al, 1999) should result in “consistent disclosures”. That is, once the information
needs of analysts have been identified, firms are likely to discuss information regarding the
intangible assets in which analysts are interested. . In other words, it is likely that
intangible asset disclosures are “sticky”. We run the following models:
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We run the above models in LOGIT regressions. The models are estimated with firm-
fixed effects to control for firm-specific factors. Results are reported in Table 3.5.
The results show that once managers disclose information about intangible assets, they are
more likely to do so in subsequent calls, i.e. disclosing information about intangible assets
commits management to continue to disclose. The one exception is information about
external intangible assets. Consistent with our finding that the information content of
disclosures about external intangible assets in the discussion portion of the call is least
pronounced, we find that managers do not commit themselves to continue to disclose
information about external intangible assets. However, if they do disclose information
about external intangible assets in the presentation portion, this disclosure does have
information content. Together, these results suggest that managers are selective in the
information they disclose about external intangible assets. A possible explanation for this
result is that information about external intangible assets is more competition sensitive
than information about other intangible assets.
The results suggest that once information needs have been identified by managers, they
will continue to provide information through conference calls.58
58 Alternatively, managers could choose to provide the disclosures through other media, such as press release or
annual report and no longer in the presentation portion of the conference call. This would, however, go against
our hypothesis and against our results.
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3.6.3 Do managers learn from the discussion portion?
The fact that information is provided in response to questions from analysts suggests that
managers are unsure about the (specific) information requirements of analysts. If
conference calls are used to identify analysts’ information needs, it is likely that managers
will provide information on intangibles in the presentation of a conference call if analysts
have asked questions on that issue in the discussion portion of the previous conference
call. In our third set of tests, we investigate this issue: we analyse if the first occurrence of
a disclosure of an aspect of intangible assets in the presentation portion of the earnings
conference call is associated with the occurrence of words related to the aspect of
intangible assets in the discussion portion of the prior earnings conference call. We run the
following models:
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We run the above models in LOGIT regressions. The models are estimated with firm-
fixed effects to control for firm-specific factors. Results are reported in Table 3.6.
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The results indicate that the first disclosure of information about aspects of intangible
assets in the presentation portion of a conference call is associated with the occurrence of
words related to that aspect of intangible assets in the Q&A part of the prior conference
call. This result holds for all categories of intangible assets; it suggests that managers use
the discussion portion of the conference call to learn about the information needs of
analysts with respect to intangible asset disclosures. In addition, managers use this
“discussion portion knowledge” to provide intangible asset disclosures in the presentation
portion of the next conference call.
3.7 Discussion and conclusions
We study whether disclosures about intangible assets in earnings conference calls are
relevant to capital market participants. We find that disclosures about innovation and
infrastructure intangible assets, external intangible assets as well as human intangible
assets have information content. This result holds for both the presentation as well as the
discussion portion of the conference call. Our findings indicate that the conference call, at
least partially, compensates for the insufficient disclosures about intangible assets in
earnings announcements, management forecasts, press releases or other financial
statements.
In a second set of tests, we find that intangible asset disclosures in conference calls are
“sticky”: disclosures in the presentation portion of one conference call are likely to be
discussed in the presentation portion of subsequent conference calls as well. This suggests
that managers informally commit to a policy to provide disclosures about intangible assets.
The one exception is disclosures related to external intangible assets; managers do not
seem to commit to disclosing information about external intangibles once they have
disclosed it in a prior call. Consistent with our finding that the information content of
disclosures about external intangible assets in the discussion portion is least pronounced,
this result suggests that managers are selective in what they disclose about external
intangible assets. A possible explanation for this effect is that disclosures about external
intangible assets are more likely to be competition sensitive compared to other intangible
assets. Finally, we find that the first occurrence of disclosures about intangible assets in the
presentation portion of the conference call is associated with the occurrence of disclosures
about these intangible assets in the discussion period of the prior conference call. This
result holds for all aspects of intangible assets and suggests that managers use the
conference call to learn about the information needs of analysts with respect to intangible
assets.
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The results from our study imply that earnings conference calls help to identify the
information needs of capital markets participants. In addition, conference calls appear to
provide a platform that (partially) compensates for the currently insufficient disclosures
under GAAP in other financial statements.
Our results should be interpreted with some caution because they are based on the analysis
of conference calls. We do not take other avenues for voluntary disclosure (e.g.
management forecasts, press releases and annual reports) into account. In addition, our
measure for intangible asset disclosure may pick up the effect of “more disclosure” rather
than solely the effect of intangible asset disclosures. However, we find that discussions
about intangible assets make up a substantial part of the conference calls that we analyse;
as such, increased disclosures may cover intangible assets. Clarification on these issues
requires an examination of the association between more comprehensive measures of
disclosure policies and stock price returns, as well as an analysis of whether additional
disclosures complement or substitute for conference calls.
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4 Do analysts voice their true beliefs in conference calls?
4.1 Introduction63
Hosting a conference call in conjunction with an earnings announcement has become
commonplace among firms over the past decade. Prior research suggests these calls are
important information events, resulting in higher trading volume, greater return volatility,
improved analyst forecast accuracy and reduced post-earnings announcement drift
(Frankel, Johnson and Skinner 1999; Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto 2002; Kimbrough
2005). Moreover, recent evidence suggests that the discussion portion with analysts is a
critical part of most conference calls because it allows analysts to elicit additional
disclosures from managers (Matsumoto, Pronk and Roelofsen 2009). While it is
undoubtedly the case that managers’ responses to analysts’ questions provide additional
information to call participants, it is also possible that participants on the call learn
something from the analysts’ questions themselves. The tone, wording and focus of
analysts’ questions can provide insight into the analysts’ opinion about the prospects of the
firm and perhaps reveal the nature of analysts’ private information. To avoid revealing
their private information to other call participants, analysts may choose to mask their
opinions in certain circumstances. The purpose of this paper is to investigate if analysts
reveal their true beliefs during conference calls and the circumstances under which they
may choose to mask them.
We investigate this issue using textual analysis of conference call transcripts. In particular,
we measure the degree of optimism/pessimism expressed by analysts during the discussion
portion of the call using a count of words deemed optimistic/pessimistic. Since we expect
analysts to be more optimistic when firms report good news, we first confirm that our
measure of analyst optimism is related to the news in the earnings announcement. We find
that analysts use less optimistic (more pessimistic) language during the discussion portion
of the call when they are surprised by the firms reporting negative earnings or when
returns in the 24 hours prior to the conference call (i.e., when the earnings press release is
distributed) are negative. These results help to validate our measure of analyst optimism.
63 This chapter is based on joint work with Dawn Matsumoto and Maarten Pronk. I appreciate comments by
workshop participants at University of Tilburg, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University.
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We then investigate whether the lower optimism expressed by analysts in the face of bad
news is tempered by the presence of institutional investors. Prior research suggests that
institutional investors trade in response to analysts’ stock recommendations and that such
trading contributes to their ability to outperform individual investors (Chen and Cheng
2006). Their ability to outperform individual investors would, however, be diminished to
the extent individuals are able to infer or anticipate analysts’ opinions (and potentially
stock recommendation changes). Given that in the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg
FD) era firms’ conference calls are publicly accessible, institutional investors would likely
prefer that analysts do not express their true beliefs during the call but rather, privately
communicate their opinions to their clients. Thus, we predict that analysts are less likely to
use pessimistic language in the face of poor firm performance for firms with high
institutional holdings. Results are consistent with this prediction.
Although analysts may not express their true opinions during the call, their forecast
revisions likely reflect their true beliefs about the firm’s future prospects. We, therefore,
examine the relation between forecast revisions and analyst optimism and the moderating
effect of institutional holdings. We find a positive relation between analysts’ forecast
revisions and our measure of analyst optimism, providing further validation of our
measure. Further, consistent with our expectations, we find that the positive relation is
attenuated for firms with greater institutional investors. This result is consistent with
analysts not expressing their true beliefs during conference calls to preserve their
institutional clients’ informational advantage.
This paper contributes to the literature on the information content of conference calls. Over
the past decade, conference calls have become an increasingly common form of voluntary
disclosure. However, until recently, most studies examining conference calls as an
information event have been limited to examining only the existence of conference calls
because transcripts of calls were not readily available. Since the passage of Reg FD,
however, transcripts for a large sample of calls are accessible for analysis and studies have
begun to analyse the content of calls and, in particular, the interaction between managers
and analysts that occurs during the discussion portion of the call (Mayew 2008;
Matsumoto et al. 2009). Although Matsumoto et al. (2009) find that discussion periods are
longer when managers fail to disclose enough information during the presentation portion
of the call (suggesting that analysts are able to elicit additional information from
managers), this study suggests that the language they use in asking questions does not
necessarily reflect their true opinions.
This paper also contributes to our general understanding of the relationship between
analysts and institutional investors. While analysts’ incentives to bias their forecasts and
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recommendations because of investment banking relationships has been well studied (Lin
and McNichols 1998; Michaely and Womack 1999; Dechow et al. 2000), less is known
about the incentives faced by analysts as a result of soft-dollar arrangements with
institutional clients. In a recent study, Juergens and Lindsey (2008) find that institutional
investors actually sell securities through the market maker of an analyst’s firm in the days
prior to the release of an analyst’s recommendation downgrading a stock — consistent
with analysts warning their institutional clients of an impending downgrade. Our results
are consistent with Juergens and Lindsey (2008) in that we find evidence that consistent
with analysts hiding their true beliefs during conference calls to preserve their clients’
informational advantage.
In the next section, we discuss our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample selection.
We present our empirical results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the findings.
4.2 Prior research and hypothesis development
Although conference calls are one of the most common forms of voluntary disclosures
made by firms, research on the actual content of conference calls has been limited until
recently — primarily due to the lack of large samples of call transcripts prior to Reg FD.
Recently, a number of studies have investigated various issues surrounding the content of
conference calls. Matsumoto, Pronk and Roelofsen (2009) investigate the relation between
management presentations during conference calls and the ensuing discussions with
analysts. They find that analyst discussion periods are longer when managers provide less
disclosure during the presentation portion of the call, suggesting that analysts are able to
elicit additional disclosures from managers during the discussion period. Mayew (2008)
investigates whether managers discriminate against analysts with unfavourable opinions of
the firm by denying their ability to ask questions during the call and find evidence
consistent with this conjecture. Both studies suggest that the analysts’ ability to ask
questions during the discussion period is important both to the analyst as well as to the
audience at large by enriching the disclosures provided by management.
In fact, the give-and-take that occurs between managers and analysts during the discussion
portion of conference calls is one of the defining characteristics that distinguish conference
calls from other mechanisms of disclosures (e.g. company-issued press releases). During
this period, analysts can ask managers to clarify or elaborate on points made during the
presentation, perhaps by asking for additional detail or supporting evidence. These
additional disclosures are undoubtedly informative to the market. However, the way in
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which analysts word their questions potentially reveals the analysts’ attitude toward the
firm as well. Moreover, analysts could preface their questions with comments that are
either supportive or disparaging, which more directly reveals their beliefs about
management and the firm’s prospects.
We argue that the optimism or pessimism expressed by analysts in their
questions/comments is likely informative to participants in the call — over and above the
actual news disclosed in the accompanying earnings release. Prior research supports the
informative nature of both analysts’ forecasts (Givoly and Lakonishok 1979; Brown,
Foster and Noreen, 1985) and their recommendations (Francis and Soffer 1997). Given
that analysts’ opinions, as expressed in their forecasts and recommendations, are
informative to the market, it seems reasonable that the language analysts use while asking
questions or making comments would be viewed as additional expressions of their
opinions (although more subtle) and would be similarly informative. Consistent with this
notion, research by Davis et al. (2008) indicates that the optimism or pessimism expressed
by management in press releases has information content, over and above the “hard”
information disclosed in the press release. We extend their finding by examining the
information content of analysts’ optimism/pessimism expressed during the discussion
portion of conference calls. Our first hypothesis is as follows:
H1: Analyst optimism/pessimism expressed during the discussion portion of a
company’s conference call is informative to the market.
Confirmation of our first hypothesis would suggest that analysts can impact a company’s
stock price by the comments they make and questions they ask during the discussion phase
of a conference call. Given the potential impact of their questions/comments, analysts may
have incentives to avoid expressing any pessimistic views they have on the firm during the
conference call. Prior research suggests that analysts have multiple incentives to avoid
issuing negative information about a firm, including investment banking relationships
(O’Brien, McNichols and Lin 2005) and preserving access to management-provided
information (Chen and Matsumoto 2006; Mayew 2008). These prior studies generally
focus on the impact these incentives have on the propensity to issue negative
recommendations and/or forecasts. However, the incentive to bias recommendations
and/or forecasts is tempered by the fact that analysts’ performance is often judged on the
quality of these two outputs and judging the quality of these outputs is relatively
straightforward (particularly for forecasts). In contrast, the optimism/pessimism expressed
during conference calls is not easily measured and so it is less likely that analysts would be
held accountable for failing to express negative views (or being overly optimistic) during
calls. The lack of accountability coupled with the pressure to appease management likely
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results in analysts’ biasing the views they express during conference calls. In particular, we
predict that analysts are less likely to express their true beliefs when the firm announces
bad news relative to when the firm announces good news. Our second hypothesis is:
H2: Analysts are less likely to express their true beliefs about the firm’s future
prospects during the conference call when the firm announces bad news relative to when
the firm announces good news.
The incentive for analysts to avoid negative views on the firm to win management’s favour
— either because of investment banking relationship and/or to maintain access to
company-provided information — is well studied in the literature. Another less well-
studied incentive that potentially impacts analysts’ decisions is the incentive to preserve
the information advantage of their institutional clients. Most analysts do not sell their
research directly to clients. Rather, analysts’ clients — largely institutional investors —
“pay” for the research they receive from analysts by directing their trades through the firm
where the analyst works (Conrad, Johnson and Wahal 2001; Cowen, Groysberg and Healy
2006). Prior research suggests that institutional investors trade in response to analysts’
recommendations and that this trading contributes to their ability to outperform individual
investors (Chen and Cheng 2006). Given the potential for analysts’ questions/comments to
impact the firms’ stock prices, institutional investors probably prefer analysts not to reveal
their true beliefs during the conference call but rather to communicate their thoughts
privately. This preference is possibly greater in the face of bad news because it is often
difficult for institutions to unwind their positions in a firm quickly, particularly if they own
large stakes in the firm.64 Therefore, to appease their institutional clients, analysts have an
incentive to avoid expressing negative views during the conference call.
Such behaviour would be consistent with the findings of Juergens and Lindsey (2008) who
find a dramatic increase in buying volume handled by the market maker of an analyst's
firm relative to other market makers on days when the analyst releases an upgrade but, in
the case of downgrades, find an increase in selling volume through the market maker, prior
to the official release of the downgrade. Their results suggest that analysts provide
information to their institutional clients in advance to allow their clients time to unwind
their positions. In the case of conference calls, analysts might avoid making their true
beliefs public during the call and instead communicate their opinions to their clients at the
64 If an institution is listening in on a conference call, it is likely the institution owns shares in the company’s
stock.
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conclusion of the call and prior to the release of any revisions in their forecasts and/or
recommendations.
Based on these arguments, we predict the incentive for analysts to avoid expressing their
true negative beliefs about the firms is greater when the firm has greater institutional
ownership. Our third hypothesis is:
H3: Analysts are more likely to avoid expressing their true negative beliefs about a
firm during the conference call when the firm has greater institutional ownership.
4.3 Data and variable measurement
4.3.1 Sample selection
We start our sample selection process by identifying announcements of earnings-related
conference calls (via the Dow Jones Calendar of Corporate Events). This procedure yields
27,672 calls. We limit our sample to firms that regularly conduct conference calls by
removing 2,665 calls from firms that conducted less than 6 calls over the sample period.
Subsequently, we gather transcripts of calls from Voxant FD wire, available through
Factiva. We are unable to find transcripts for 8,505 calls, leaving us with a sample of
16,502 conference call transcripts. We further limit our sample to calls held during trading
hours (calls beginning after 9:30 a.m. and before 16:00 p.m. EST) by NYSE/NASDAQ
firms between 1 January 2003 and 31 December 2005, because we include a market-based
measure of news in the earnings announcement as an independent variable. This process
yields 11,720 potential conference calls. We lose 3,346 observations due to missing Trade
and Quote (TAQ) data, I/B/E/S analyst forecast data, Compustat data and/or CRSP data.
We lose another 1,708 observations by removing outliers (at the 1% level) in dependent
and independent variables. Our final sample includes 6,666 firm quarters. Table 4.1, Panel
A details our sample selection process.
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Table 4.1
Sample selection and descriptive data
Panel A: Sample attrition
Earnings-related conference calls on DJ Calendar of Corporate Events 36,074
Not listed on NYSE or NASDAQ 8,402
Calls of firms with less than six conference calls 2,665
Transcripts not available on Voxant FD Wire 8,505
Calls outside trading hours 4,782
Missing data on TAQ, IBES or Compustat 3,346
Outliers in dependent and independent variables (1%) 1,708
Final sample 6,666
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Table 4.1 (Continued)
Sample selection and descriptive data
Panel B: Distribution of observations across industry
No. % % of
of obs. of obs. population
Manufacturing 2,334 35.01 34.11
Finance and Insurance 1,320 19.80 28.09
Retail Trade 436 6.54 3.96
Information 419 6.29 10.37
Mining 370 5.55 3.12
Professional, Scientific and Technical
Services 246 3.69 4.16
Utilities 233 3.50 2.26
Transportation and Warehousing 222 3.33 2.36
Wholesale Retail 211 3.17 2.58
Accomodation and Food Services 195 2.93 1.67
Administrative and Support, Waste
Management and Remediation Services 152 2.28 1.75
Construction 149 2.24 1.02
Health Care and Social Assistance 126 1.89 1.41
Real estate and Leasing 105 1.58 1.51
Other Services 46 0.69 0.38
Art, Entertainment and Recreation 42 0.63 0.42
Educational Services 42 0.63 0.31
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and
Hunting 10 0.15 0.31
Unclassified Establishments 8 0.12 0.21
6,666 100 100
Panel B of Table 4.1 presents the distribution of our sample across industries, using the
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). We also report the percent of
the population of NYSE and NASDAQ firms comprising each industry classification. Our
sample spans a wide range of industries and, in general, reflects the general distribution of
industries in the population. The one exception is the finance and insurance industry,
which comprises only 19% of our sample but comprises 28% of the NYSE/NASDAQ
firms.
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4.3.2 Dependent variables
4.3.2.1 Optimism measure
Our measure of optimism is based on word counts of positive and negative words in the
discussion portion of the conference call. We split the transcripts into the presentation and
discussion portion of the call by searching for the first occurrence of the word "operator"
after the first 1,500 characters of the transcript. We then checked whether the transcripts
were split appropriately by searching the first 400 characters of the discussion for key
words or phrases that are typically associated with the start of the discussion — for
example, "instructions", "question-and-answer", "the floor is now open", "at this time".
For discussion transcripts that did not include any of the key words, we performed the split
manually. In addition, each transcript includes a legal disclaimer at the end of the
document. We removed this disclaimer from all transcripts.
Within the discussion portion of the conference call, we determine whether a fragment was
spoken by management or by an analyst. Speakers also appearing in the transcript of the
preceding presentation are deemed to be part of management. If speakers did not appear in
the preceding presentation, we base the classification of the speaker as either management
or analyst based on the affiliation and position stated in the call.
For each text fragment (i.e. the text that starts after the name and affiliationand continues
till the next name and affiliation) that is spoken by an analyst we count the number of
“positive words” and the number of “negative words”.65 Our definition of positive words
and negative words is based on a review of word frequencies in some 900 conference call
transcripts. We counted the total frequencies of all words in these transcripts and scanned
the resulting 7,892 words with a frequency of more than 10, for words with a clear positive
tone and words with a clear negative tone. This procedure resulted in 82 words with a
positive tone and 45 words with a negative tone. Additionally, our count of positive words
excludes (where appropriate) positive words that are preceded by “no”, “not”, “not very”,
“not so”, “aren’t” or “haven’t”. Those word combinations are included as a single negative
word in our counts of negative words. This procedure adds 90 word combinations to our
65 We use VBA programs to count words and compute our proxies for optimism. Other widely available content
analysis software (such as Diction) apply a similar approach to measuring optimism, but are less flexible in
distinguishing between words spoken by management and analysts.
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definition of negative words. Exhibit 1 provides a list of all positive and negative words
used in our definition of optimism.
We count the number of positive words spoken by analysts (POSANAL) as well as the
number of negative words (NEGANAL). In order to control for the length of the call, we
scale our measures by the total number of words spoken by analysts. Thus, we also count
the total number of words spoken by analysts in the discussion (#WORDSANAL). This
results in the following definition of analyst optimism (OPTANAL):
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics for our optimism measure along with additional
variables used in our tests (and explained in more detail below). The mean of OPTANAL is
0.0058, indicating that on average there are more optimistic words spoken by analysts than
pessimistic words.
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Exhibit 1
Words counted in the definition of optimism
Panel A: Positive words
accomplished good strength
accomplishment happy strengthen
accomplishments healthy strengthened
achieve impressive strengthening
achieved improve strong
achievements improved stronger
achieving improvement strongest
advantage improvements strongly
attractive improving success
benefit leadership successes
benefited leading successful
benefits meet successfully
best momentum superior
compliment opportunities sustainable
confidence opportunity terrific
confident optimism top
congratulate optimistic tremendous
congratulations outperform tremendously
encouraging outperformed win
enhance outperforming winning
enthusiasm outstanding wins
enthusiastic positive won
excellence positively
excellent progress
excited promising
excitement prosperity
exciting proud
fantastic recovers
favorable recovery
fortunately satisfaction
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Panel B: Negative words
not accomplished no improvements bankruptcies
not achieve not improving bankruptcy
didn’t achieve no leadership cautious
not achieving not leading cautiously
no advantage not meet challenged
not attractive didn’t meet claimants
not very attractive no momentum damage
no benefit no opportunities damages
didn’t benefit no opportunity delay
not benefit no optimism deterioration
no benefits not outperform disappointed
no compliment didn’t outperform disappointing
not compliment not outperformed disappointment
no confidence haven’t outperformed dispute
not confident not outperforming disruption
not very confident aren’t outperforming disruptions
not encouraging not outstanding downsizing
not very encouraging not positive failure
not enhance not very positive headwinds
didn’t enhance no progress impaired
no enthusiasm not promising inefficiencies
not enthusiastic not very promising lose
not excellent not proud losing
not so excellent no recovery overhang
not excited no satisfaction poor
not very excited no strength problematic
not so excited not strengthening recession
no excitement not strong severe
not exciting not very strong shutdowns
not very exciting not so strong slowdown
not so exciting not stronger slower
(Continued on next page)
Do Analysts Voice Their True Beliefs in Conference Calls?
109
(Exhibit 1 – Continued)
not fantastic no success slowing
not favourable no successes sluggish
not good not successful struggles
not very good not very successful struggling
not so good not superior termination
isn’t good not sustainable underperforming
isn’t very good not terrific unfavourable
not happy not tremendous unfortunate
not healthy not tremendously unfortunately
not impressive not win unsuccessful
not very impressive no win weakest
not so impressive not winning write down
not improve no wins
didn’t improve apologise
no improvement bad
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Table 4.2
Descriptive statistics
Variable66 Mean Median
Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
OPTANAL 0.0057 0.0053 0.0034 –0.0015 0.0172
OPTMGMT 0.0084 0.0081 0.0036 0.0006 0.0205
OPTPRES 0.0122 0.0117 0.0050 0.0016 0.0274
FREV 0.0009- –0.0004 0.0034 –0.0238 0.0129
INSTHOLD 0.6086 0.6636 0.2738 0 1.8385
CHANGEROA 0.0011 0.0004 0.0148 –0.0829 0.1051
RETURNDISC 0.0000 0 0.0108 –0.0472 0.0416
RETDAYB4 0.0019 0.0016 0.0414 –0.1614 0.1408
NEGRETDAYB4 0.4712 0 0.4992 0 1
FERROR 0.0005 0.0004 0.0038 –0.0291 0.0209
66 OPTANAL is defined as (number of positive words spoken by analysts less number of negative words spoken by
analysts), divided by the total number of words spoken by analysts. OPTPRES and OPTMGMT are defined in a
similar way as OPTANAL for the words spoken by management in the presentation (OPTPRES) and the words
spoken by management in the discussion section of the call (OPTMGMT). FREV is the difference between the
median forecast issued for quarter q+1 in the 90 days prior to the conference call for quarter q and the median
forecast issued for quarter q+1 in the 60 days following the conference call. INSTHOLD is the total
shareholdings reported by investment managers as a percentage of total shares outstanding, both per the
CDA/Spectrum institutional holdings (13f) database and measured at the end of the quarter preceding the
conference call. CHANGEROA is the change in ROA, defined as earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat
quarterly item 8) divided by ending total assets (Compustat quarterly item 44). RETDAYB4 is the return in the
24 hours prior to the conference call, measured as the quote midpoint at the start of the conference call
(MIDSTART) less the quote midpoint at the same time one trading day before the conference call (MIDDAYB4)
divided by MIDDAYB4 (data obtained from the TAQ database). NEGRETDAYB4 is an indicator variable equal to 1
when RETDAYB4 is negative and zero otherwise. FERROR is the actual EPS (from IBES unsplit-adjusted actuals
file) less the last mean consensus forecast prior to the earnings announcement (from IBES unsplit-adjusted
summary file) divided by the stock price at the end of quarter (Compustat quarterly item 14). MISS is an
indicator variable equal to 1 when FERROR is negative and zero otherwise. RETQTR is the market-adjusted
returns cumulated from calendar day –92 to day –2 relative to the conference call date. MB is the market-to-book
as per the end of the quarter (Compustat) and LNMVAL is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation as per
the end of the quarter (Compustat). AF is the number of analysts that issued an EPS forecast for the current
quarter (from IBES summary file). #WORDSANAL is the number of words spoken by analysts.
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Variable66 Mean Median
Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
MISS 0.2628 0 0.4402 0 1
RETQTR 0.0131- -0.0167 0.1368 –0.4503 0.4733
MB 2.7861 2.1944 2.4874 –8.4687 27.7597
LNMVAL 7.3364 7.2396 1.3340 4.3392 11.0906
AF 8.3393 7 5.5550 1 27
#WORDSANAL 1,423.0000 1361.5 646.97329 175 3640
4.3.2.2 Return during the discussion
We use a sub-sample of 1,263 conference calls (made between January and March 2005)
for which we have exact start and end times for each segment of the call. We match the
times to our transcripts and calculate the number of words spoken per minute in the
presentation and discussion portions of the call. We use the median number of words
spoken per minute (160 and 157 for the presentation and discussion portions of the call,
respectively) to compute the approximate length, in minutes, of the presentation and the
start time of the discussion. We use TAQ data to calculate the return over the window
starting at the approximated start time of the discussion and ending 60 minutes after the
start of the call.
4.3.3 Explanatory variables
To test our hypotheses requires measures of 1) analysts’ true beliefs, 2) bad news, and 3)
institutional ownership. We measure analysts’ true beliefs based on revisions in their
forecasts. As discussed previously, analysts’ forecasts are easily compared to actual
earnings and therefore, it is more difficult for analysts to bias these measures.67 As such,
we measure the revision in analysts’ next quarter earnings as the difference between the
67 We recognise that prior studies suggest that analysts occasionally bias their forecast – in particular, analysts
appear to issue more optimistic forecasts early on and subsequently “walk-down” their forecasts as the year
progresses (Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki 2004). The walk-down effect should not bias our results as long as
the level of initial optimism is not greater for firms who subsequently report bad news (resulting in the need for a
greater walk-down following bad news that does not necessarily represent the analysts’ true beliefs). In other
words, as long as revisions in analysts forecast is not a poorer measure of analysts true beliefs when firms report
bad news, our results should not be biased. We do not expect this to be the case. Note that if a bigger walk-down
is triggered by the bad news reported by the firm, this in itself will not bias our results as it is still an appropriate
measure of the analysts’ true beliefs.
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median forecast issued for quarter q+1 in the 90 days prior to the conference call for
quarter q and the median forecast issued for quarter q+1 in the 60 days following the
conference call (FREV). We only include analysts with forecasts at both horizons (before
and after the call) so that our median forecast measure at each horizon is based on the same
analyst pool. More positive revisions in analysts’ forecasts following the conference call
imply analysts have more positive views about the firm.
To measure accounting bad news, we use a dummy variable (MISS), which is equal to 1 if
actual EPS for the quarter (per IBES unsplit-adjusted actuals file) is less than the mean
consensus forecast EPS for the quarter (per IBES unsplit-adjusted summary file) and zero
otherwise. Prior research suggests that firms incur a market penalty when they miss
analysts’ expectations (Bartov et al. 2002), although recent evidence suggests this penalty
has dissipated since 2002 (Koh et al. 2008). Nevertheless, managers still appear to view
missing expectations as problematic and take actions to avoid this outcome (Graham et al.
2005). Given the importance of missing expectations to both the market and management,
it appears reasonable to assume analysts are equally sensitive to this benchmark.
As an alternative measure of bad news, we use bad news as perceived by the market. We
use a dummy variable (NEGRETDAYB4), which is equal to 1 if the return over the 24 hours
before the start of the call is negative and zero otherwise.
Finally, we measure institutional ownership using data from the CDA/Spectrum
Institutional (13f) Holdings database and define institutional holdings (INST) as the total
shareholdings reported by investment managers as a percentage of total shares outstanding,
both measured at the end of the quarter preceding the conference call. In our tests of
hypothesis three, we use a dummy variable (INSTHIGH) that is equal to 1 if institutional
holdings are above the median of the sample, and zero otherwise.
Descriptive statistics in Table 4.2 indicate that average forecast revisions are negative. The
average percentage of institutional holdings is 65%, which is relatively high compared to
prior studies and is likely due to the fact that our sample is comprised of firms with 1)
available conference call transcripts and 2) active analyst coverage.68
68 In their study of the firms who host open vs. closed conference calls, Bushee et al. (2003) report an average
institutional ownership percentage of 36% and 42% for their open and closed call samples, respectively. The
difference between their sample and ours suggests that transcripts of conference calls may be more readily
available for large firms.
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4.3.4 Control variables
In our main analyses, we use an industry-fixed effects model, which controls for static
industry-specific characteristics that affect optimism. Industry membership is based on
two-digit codes of the North American Classification System (NAICS). Since it is also
possible that our results are related to firm-specific and quarter-specific characteristics, we
include additional control variables in our regressions. First, we include a measure of firm
size equal to the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of the quarter
(MVAL). Second, we include a measure of analyst following (AF), equal to the number of
analysts that issued an EPS forecast for the current quarter (from IBES summary file).
Third, we include market-to-book (MB) per the end of the quarter as a proxy for growth.
The optimism of analysts on the conference call is also likely associated with performance
over the completed quarter. We, therefore,include two measures of performance in our
regressions. Return on assets (ROA), equals earnings before extraordinary items
(Compustat quarterly item 8) divided by ending total assets (Compustat quarterly item 44).
Market performance is based on equally weighted market-adjusted returns cumulated from
day –92 to day –2 relative to the conference call date (RETQTR), which approximates
returns over the quarter.
We further control for the magnitude of news by including unexpected earnings
performance and unexpected performance from the market’s perspective. Unexpected
earnings performance (FERROR) is defined as the difference between actual EPS for the
quarter (per IBES unsplit-adjusted actuals file) and the mean consensus forecasted EPS for
the quarter (per IBES unsplit-adjusted summary file), divided by the price at the end of the
quarter (per CRSP). Unexpected performance from the market’s perspective is defined as
returns (RETDAYB4) in the 24hours prior to the conference call, measured as the quote
midpoint at the start of the conference call (MIDstart) less the quote midpoint at the same
time one trading day before the conference call (MIDdayprior) divided by MIDdayprior (data
obtained from the TAQ database).
The optimistic language used by analysts on the conference call is likely to be affected by
the language used by management. Analysts may repeat words used by management or
may generally be more inclined to use optimistic language when management uses
optimistic language. We control for the optimistic language used by management by
including two measures of the usage of optimistic language by management. Optimism in
the presentation portion of the call (OPTPRES) is defined in a similar way as OPTANAL, i.e.
positive less negative words spoken by management in the presentation portion of the call,
divided by the number of words spoken by management. Optimistic language used by
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management in the discussion portion of the call (OPTMGMT) is defined in a similar way,
using the text spoken by management in the discussion portion of the call. We also
include the number of words spoken by analysts on the discussion to control for a potential
effect of the length of the analysts’ discussion.
Finally, we include fiscal quarter dummy variables (QTR2, QTR3, and QTR4) to control
for differences across quarters in optimism and year dummy variables (Y2003 and Y2004)
to control for time-specific events that may affect optimism (e.g., macroeconomic shocks).
Descriptive statistics of our control variables are presented in Table 4.2. Similar to our
OPTANAL variable, the means of OPTMGMT and OPTPRES are both positive, indicating that
management uses more optimistic than pessimistic words during the presentation and
discussion portions of the conference call. Not surprisingly, the means of OPTMGMT and
OPTPRES are greater than the percentage of OPTANAL on average, indicating that
management uses more optimistic language than analysts.
The average return during the quarter is close to zero (–.8%). Consistent with the high
institutional ownership of our sample, the average analyst following is 8.1, a relatively
high number compared to other studies.69
Table 4.3 presents a correlation matrix of all our variables (Spearman correlations reported
above the diagonal and Pearson correlations reported below the diagonal).
69 Bushee et al (2003) report analysts’ following of between 3.6 and 4.0, again suggesting that transcripts may be
more readily available for firms with greater interest from sophisticated market participants – analysts and
institutions.
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4.4 Empirical tests
4.4.1 Is analyst optimism informative?
Hypothesis 1 poses that analyst optimism/pessimism expressed during the discussion of a
company’s conference call is informative for the market. We presume that
optimism/pessimism is informative when stock returns are affected during the conference
call. We, therefore, test whether the analyst optimism is positively associated with
contemporaneous stock market returns during the discussion period. We use the following
model to test Hypothesis 1:
We use industry-fixed effects. Further, since we have multiple observations for each firm,
we report clustered standard errors.72 Table 4.4 provides our results. If the optimism of
analysts is informative to the market, we expect higher returns during the discussion
period, resulting in a positive coefficient on OPTANAL. We find that optimism/pessimism of
analysts is informative to the market (coefficient on OPTANAL positively significant,
p-value = 0.0156).
72 Our results are inferentially the same when we do not cluster standard errors or when we only cluster on firms.
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Table 4.4
Is analyst optimism informative?
Predicted Parameter Standard
Variables73 Sign estimate error t-value p-value74
OPTANAL + 0.0898 0.0416 2.16 0.0156
OPTMGMT ? 0.0612- 0.0411 1.49- 0.1366
OPTPRES ? 0.0125 0.0307 0.41 0.6840
RETPRES ? 0.1509 0.0222 6.81 <.0001
RETDAYB4 ? 0.0022 0.0043 0.52 0.6009
FERROR ? 0.0005 0.0432 0.01 0.9906
CHANGEROA ? 0.0063 0.0111 0.57 0.5698
RETQTR ? 0.0012- 0.0012 0.94- 0.3483
MB ? 0.0001- 0.0001 2.53- 0.0113
LNMVAL ? 0.0000- 0.0001 0.12- 0.9021
AF ? 0.0000 0.0000 0.51 0.6122
#WORDSANAL ? 0.0000 0.0000 0.25 0.8013
QTR2 ? 0.0002- 0.0004 0.51- 0.6089
QTR3 ? 0.0003- 0.0004 0.78- 0.4342
QTR4 ? 0.0003- 0.0004 0.68- 0.4971
Y2003 ? 0.0005 0.0004 1.36 0.1734
Y2004 ? 0.0001- 0.0003 0.36- 0.7198
N = 6,666
4.4.2 Effect of bad news on reflection of analysts’ true beliefs
In Hypothesis 2, we predict that analysts are less likely to express their true beliefs about
the firm’s future prospects during a conference call when the firm announces bad news
compared to when the firm announces good news. We test this hypothesis for both
accounting bad news (missed median forecast) and market bad news (negative stock return
on the earnings announcement). To test Hypothesis 2, we use the following models:
73 See variable definitions on Table 2. QTR2, QTR3 and QTR4 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the conference
calls relate to fiscal quarters 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Y2004 and Y2005 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the
conference calls are in 2004 and 2005 respectively.
74 p-values are one tailed for variables with directional predictions and are two tailed otherwise.
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In both regressions, we are interested in coefficient ȕ3. If ȕ3 is positive and significant,
analysts moderate the tone of their questions and comments when there is (accounting) bad
news. We further predict that there is a positive association between the analysts’ true
optimism (Forecast Revision, FREV) and the optimism voiced on the conference call
(OPTANAL). Besides, we also predict that analyst optimism will be lower when the firm
misses the earnings per share forecast (MISS) or when the market reacts negatively to the
earnings announcement (NEGRETDAYB4).
The results of our analyses are presented in Table 4.5. We use industry-fixed effects.
Further, since we have multiple observations for each firm and conference calls may
cluster around the same dates, we report standard errors that are clustered by firm and by
the date of the conference call75.
75 Our results are inferentially the same when we do not cluster standard errors or when we only cluster on firm.
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Table 4.5
Reflection of analysts’ true beliefs in case of bad news
Panel A: Earnings bad news
Predicted
sign
Parameter
estimate
Standard
error t-value p-value76
Variables77
FREV + 0.0863 0.0146 5.930 <.0001
MISS - 0.0008- 0.0001 7.840- <.0001
FREV*MISS - 0.0395- 0.0229 1.730- 0.0418
OPTMGMT ? 0.1554 0.0126 12.360 <.0001
OPTPRES ? 0.0880 0.0088 9.970 <.0001
ChangeROA ? 0.0077 0.0027 2.810 0.0050
RETDAYB4 ? 0.0011 0.0003 3.640 0.0003
MB ? 0.0000 0.0000 0.790 0.4316
LNMVAL ? 0.0002- 0.0000 4.740- <.0001
AF ? 0.0000 0.0000 3.550 0.0004
#WORDSANAL ? 0.0000- 0.0000 10.780- <.0001
QTR2 ? 0.0002 0.0001 1.420 0.1571
QTR3 ? 0.0001- 0.0001 0.790- 0.4298
QTR4 ? 0.0000- 0.0001 0.400- 0.6912
Y2003 ? 0.0003 0.0001 3.350 0.0008
Y2004 ? 0.0001 0.0001 1.270 0.2046
N = 6,666
76 p-values are one tailed for variables with directional predictions and are two tailed otherwise.
77 See variable definitions on Table 2. QTR2, QTR3 and QTR4 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the conference
calls relate to fiscal quarters 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Y2004 and Y2005 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the
conference calls are held in 2004 and 2005 respectively.
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Panel B: Returns bad news
Predicted
sign
Parameter
estimate
Standard
error t-value p-value78
Variables79
FREV + 0.0953 0.0166 5.74 <.0001
NEGRETDAYB4 - 0.0008- 0.0001 9.73- <.0001
FREV*NEGRETDAYB4 - 0.0468- 0.0218 2.14- 0.0161
OPTMGMT ? 0.1565 0.0125 12.51 <.0001
OPTPRES ? 0.0911 0.0087 10.43 <.0001
ChangeROA ? 0.0086 0.0027 3.16 0.0016
RETDAYB4 ? 0.0014 0.0003 4.55 <.0001
MB ? 0.0000 0.0000 1.06 0.2914
LNMVAL ? 0.0002- 0.0000 4.84- <.0001
AF ? 0.0000 0.0000 4.44 <.0001
#WORDSANAL ? 0.0000- 0.0000 10.79- <.0001
QTR2 ? 0.0002 0.0001 1.66 0.0964
QTR3 ? 0.0001- 0.0001 0.62- 0.5351
QTR4 ? 0.0000- 0.0001 0.12- 0.9078
Y2003 ? 0.0004 0.0001 3.83 0.0001
Y2004 ? 0.0001 0.0001 1.40 0.1623
N = 6,666
78 p-values are one tailed for variables with directional predictions and are two tailed otherwise.
79 See variable definitions on Table 2. QTR2, QTR3 and QTR4 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the conference
calls relate to fiscal quarter 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Y2004 and Y2005 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the
conference calls are held in 2004 and 2005 respectively.
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The results in Panel A indicate that the coefficient on FREV*MISS is significantly
negative (p-value = 0.0418), i.e., analysts do not fully voice their true optimism/pessimism
when there is accounting bad news. As predicted, the coefficient on FREV is significantly
positive (p-value <0.0001), and the coefficient on MISS is significantly negative (p-value
<0.0001), i.e., as predicted, there is an association between the analysts’ true optimism and
the optimism voiced on the call. Analysts are less optimistic when there is accounting bad
news. Panel B shows that the results are stronger when there is market bad news, defined
as a negative return on the earnings announcement (FREV*MISS, p-value <0.0001;
NEGRETDAYB4, p-value <0.0001).
4.4.3 Effect of institutional holdings
We examine whether the analysts’ optimism is associated with the level of institutional
holdings in the firm. While literature generally recognises the analysts as potential
monitors of the firm (Healy and Palepu, 2001), the effectiveness of this group of
intermediaries to monitor managers has been called into question due to potential conflict
of interests (Healy and Palepu, 2003). If conflict of interests exists, analysts may
accommodate their comments and questions, during the earnings conference call, to their
incentives. More specifically, analysts may not question or make a comment, because they
are aware that their buy-side clients have invested in the firm and by asking critical
questions or making pessimistic remarks they may jeopardise their relationship with their
buy-side clients. The analyst may, therefore, rather not question or make the comment, but
try to obtain or confirm the information in a subsequent one-on-one with the firm, and
share that information exclusively with his/her buy-side client before making it public.
Therefore, it is possible that analysts moderate the tone of their remarks about the firm’s
performance when their views are negative and institutional holdings are high. We,
therefore, split our sample into a “negative view” sample and a “positive view” sample,
based on analyst forecast revisions. When the analyst revises downwards, we include the
observation in our “negative view” sample. Otherwise, the observation is included in our
“positive view” sample.80
80 Alternatively, one can define a “negative view” as a revision that is lower than the average or median analyst
revision for the industry in the quarter. In non-tabulated tests, we find that our results are robust if we split our
sample on the mean or median forecast revision (divided by price) in the industry in the quarter of the conference
call.
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The introduction of Regulation Fair Disclosure may have aggravated this phenomenon.
Due to Regulation Fair Disclosure, all buy-side analysts have access to conference calls,
thus, increasing the possibility that the buy-side clients of sell-side analysts are listening in
on the call or are reading the transcripts.
We, therefore, examine whether the extent to which the optimism of analysts reflects their
true beliefs is affected by the level of institutional holdings. We assume that the analysts’
true beliefs are reflected in the subsequent earnings forecast revision and we use the
forecast revision as a proxy for the analysts’ true beliefs. Hypothesis 3 poses that analysts
are more likely to avoid expressing their true negative beliefs about a firm during the
conference call when the firm has greater institutional ownership.
To test our hypothesis, we use the following model:
We predict that ȕ1 is positive and significant, indicating that optimism of analysts during
the discussion portion of the conference call reflects the analysts’ true beliefs. We further
predict that ȕ3 is negative and significant, indicating that high institutional holdings reduce
the extent to which the optimism of analysts on the conference call reflects their true
beliefs. Table 4.6 presents the result of our analysis.
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Table 4.6
Effect of institutional holdings on reflection of optimism
Negative forecast revision sample
Predicted
sign
Parameter
estimate
Standard
error t-value p-value81
Variables82
FREV + 0.1173 0.0219 5.36 <.0001
INSTHIGH ? 0.0001- 0.0001 0.83- 0.4044
FREV*INSTHIGH - 0.0989- 0.0276 3.58- 0.0002
FERROR ? 0.0327 0.0130 2.51 0.0122
OPTMGMT ? 0.1595 0.0164 9.70 <.0001
OPTPRES ? 0.0867 0.0119 7.30 <.0001
CHANGEROA ? 0.0080 0.0035 2.26 0.0236
RETDAYB4 ? 0.0013 0.0004 3.42 0.0006
MB ? 0.0000 0.0000 1.47 0.1404
LNMVAL ? 0.0002- 0.0001 2.82- 0.0048
AF ? 0.0000 0.0000 1.80 0.0722
#WORDSANAL ? 0.0000- 0.0000 7.80- <.0001
QTR2 ? 0.0002 0.0001 1.23 0.2206
QTR3 ? 0.0000- 0.0001 0.07- 0.9475
QTR4 ? 0.0000 0.0001 0.27 0.7857
Y2003 ? 0.0005 0.0001 3.71 0.0002
Y2004 ? 0.0000- 0.0001 0.15- 0.8833
81 p-values are one tailed for variables with directional predictions and are two tailed otherwise.
82 See variable definitions on Table 2. QTR2, QTR3 and QTR4 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the conference
calls relate to fiscal quarters 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Y2004 and Y2005 are dummy variables equal to 1 if the
conference calls are held in 2004 and 2005 respectively.
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The results in Table 4.6 show that the analysts’ negative true beliefs are reflected in the
optimism/pessimism of analysts during the call. Further, the results confirm that the
analysts’ true beliefs are less reflected in the optimism voiced on the conference call, when
institutional holdings are high. Non-tabulated results for the positive forecast revision
sample indicate that institutional holdings have no effect on the extent to which positive
true beliefs are reflected in the optimism voiced by analysts on the conference call.
4.5 Conclusions
The purpose of this research is to investigate whether analysts reveal their true beliefs
during conference calls as well as the circumstances under which they may choose to mask
them. We investigate this issue using textual analysis of conference call transcripts. We
count words with a positive tone and words with a negative tone used by analysts in the
discussion portion of the conference call. These counts are used to construct a measure of
the amount of optimistic/pessimistic language used by analysts.
In our first test, we examine whether optimistic language of analysts is informative to the
market. We find a positive association between the optimistic language used by analysts
during the discussion portion of the conference call and contemporaneous stock returns.
We infer that the optimistic language used by analysts is informative. Our results suggest
that analysts can impact a company’s stock price by their comments and questions during
the discussion portion of a conference call. With this, we extend the findings of Davis et al.
(2008) — optimistic language used by management in the earning press release is
informative — to analysts’ optimism/pessimism expressed during the discussion portion of
conference calls.
Prior research suggests that analysts have multiple incentives to avoid issuing negative
information about a firm, including investment banking relationships (O’Brien, McNichols
and Lin 2005) and preserving access to management-provided information (Chen and
Matsumoto 2006 and Mayew 2008). Our second set of tests suggest that the lack of
accountability for language used in conference calls coupled with the pressure to appease
management result in biased view of analysts expressed during conference calls. We find
that analysts are less likely to express their true beliefs when the firm announces bad news
compared to when the firm announces good news.
The incentive for analysts to avoid negative views on the firm to win management’s favour
— either because of investment banking relationship and/or to maintain access to
company-provided information — is well studied in the literature. Another less-studied
incentive that potentially impacts analysts’ decisions is the incentive to preserve the
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information advantage of their institutional clients. In our third set of tests, we find that
analysts are more likely to avoid expressing their true negative beliefs about a firm during
the conference call when the firm has greater institutional ownership. Institutional
investors are likely to prefer that analysts do not reveal their true beliefs during the
conference call but communicate their thoughts privately. This preference is likely to be
greater in the face of bad news because it is often difficult for institutions to unwind their
positions in a firm quickly, particularly if they have large stakes in the firm. Our results
suggest that analysts bias the language of conference calls to appease their buy-side
institutional clients and to preserve the information advantage of their institutional clients.
Analysts appease their buy-side clients because they are normally paid by these clients
through soft-dollar arrangements.
To summarise, our results indicate that the optimism reflected in the discussion portion of
conference calls is biased. This bias may partly be due to analysts appeasing management
in order to maintain access to management. However, our tests further suggest that the
positive relation between the analysts’ true beliefs and the optimism voiced on the
conference call is attenuated for firms with greater institutional investors. This result is
consistent with analysts biasing their language during conference calls to preserve the
information advantage of their institutional clients’. Instead of voicing their true beliefs on
the conference call, analysts may communicate their opinions at the conclusion of the call
and prior to the release of any revisions in their forecasts and/or recommendations.
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5 Conclusion
Over the past two decades, conference calls with analysts have gained a prominent place in
investor communications. Their flexibility, interactivity and relatively informal nature
have been mentioned as primary advantages of conference calls. This suggests conference
calls play an active role in informing capital markets. What the exact nature of that role is,
is an empirical question. This research provides evidence on that question.
From the first study in this research, it can be concluded that one of the primary benefits of
hosting a conference call — as opposed to simply issuing an earnings press release — is
that analysts are able to play an active role in uncovering information about the firm,
resulting in a richer information environment.. By probing managers more when they
provide relatively little information, the information flow to capital markets increases.
More specifically, this study finds that unexpectedly low levels of financial disclosures in
the presentation by management, result in more financially focused questions by analysts.
Contrary to what one might expect, discussion periods are not shorter when managers
provide more forward-looking disclosures. Rather, discussion periods appear longer after
unexpectedly high levels of forward-looking disclosures in the discussion portion,
suggesting that analysts demand confirmation of forward-looking disclosures. This study
also provides evidence to suggest that, in general, more words spoken during calls do
represent more information, i.e. when the call is longer, the revisions of analyst earnings
forecasts are greater.
The second study in this research provides evidence on the nature of the information in the
conference call that is provided to capital markets over and above the information in the
earnings press release. It indicates that the conference call, at least partially, compensates
for the insufficient disclosures about intangible assets in earnings announcements,
management forecasts, press releases or other financial statements. Disclosures about
innovation and infrastructure intangible assets, external intangible assets as well as human
intangible assets have information content, i.e. these disclosures move stock prices. This
result holds for both the presentation as well as the discussion portion of the conference
call. This study also finds that intangible asset disclosures in conference calls are “sticky”:
disclosures in the presentation portion of one conference call is likely to be discussed in
the presentation portion of subsequent conference calls as well. This suggests that
managers informally commit to a policy to provide disclosures about intangible assets.
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Further, this study suggests that managers use the conference call to learn about the
information needs of analysts with respect to intangible assets. If analysts ask a question
about intangible assets, managers are more likely to voluntarily provide information on
that category of intangible assets in future conference calls.
In the last study in this research, the tone of language in conference calls is studied. More
specifically, it is investigated whether the specific setting of the conference call makes
analysts bias their tone of language. The results suggest that analysts bias the language of
conference calls. This bias may partly be due to analysts appeasing management in order
to maintain access to management. However, the study also finds that analysts bias their
language to appease their buy-side institutional clients and to preserve the information
advantage of their institutional clients.
Overall, the results of this research suggest that the conference call plays an active role in
informing capital markets. The conference call adds to the information environment by
providing analysts the opportunity to probe management, and by providing relevant
disclosures about intangible assets over and above the earnings press release. However, the
research also suggests that analysts participating in the call are not neutral, but bias their
language in the conference call to appease management and their buy-side institutional
clients.
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Summary
Conference calls held in conjunction with an earnings release have become increasingly
common in recent years, yet there is little evidence on the reason these calls are
incrementally informative over the accompanying press release. In Chapter 2 of this
dissertation, one potential source for the incremental informativenature of conference calls
is examined – the ability of analysts to elicit new information from managers during the
discussion portion of the call. Using a sample of over 10,000 conference call transcripts,
the relation between information provided by managers during the presentation portion of
conference calls and the subsequent discussion period with analysts is examined. I find
that when managers provide abnormally low levels of disclosure during the presentation
portion of the call, analyst discussion periods are longer. In addition, the relation between
low disclosure in the presentation and longer discussion periods is stronger for firms with
greater analyst following. I also present evidence that, in general, longer calls are more
informative to the market – they are associated with larger analyst forecast revisions and
improvements in analysts’ forecast accuracy. Finally, I explore whether certain types of
disclosures during the presentation lead to shorter discussions. I find that greater financial
disclosures lead to shorter discussions while greater forward-looking disclosures lead to
longer discussions. Overall, the results suggest that analysts play an active role in
uncovering information during conference calls, resulting in a richer information
environment than might otherwise exist.
In Chapter 3, the relationship between intangible asset disclosures in conference calls and
contemporaneous stock price reactions is examined. Based on intangible asset disclosures
in over 8,000 earnings conference calls, I provide evidence that stock markets respond to
disclosures of intangible asset information in conference calls. In addition, I find that
intangible asset disclosures are “sticky”: once information about intangible assets is
presented in the presentation portion of a conference call, it is more likely that information
about the same category of intangible assets will be discussed in the presentation portion of
subsequent conference calls. The one exception is information about external intangible
assets; managers are not more likely to disclose information about external intangible
assets once they have done so in the past. Together with our finding that the information
content of disclosures about external intangible assets in the discussion portion is least
pronounced, this result suggest that managers are selective in the disclosures they provide
about external intangible assets. Finally, I find that managers learn about the information
The Role of Analyst Conference Calls in Capital Markets
140
needs of analysts from the questions about intangible assets that are raised by analysts
during the discussion portion of the call, i.e. in the next conference call, managers are more
likely to voluntarily provide information on these intangible assets in the presentation.
Jointly, these results suggest that disclosures about intangible asset - are informative,
managers try to tailor their disclosures to the demands of analysts, but managers are more
selective with respect to disclosures about external intangible assets.
In Chapter 4, I investigate whether analysts reveal their true beliefs during conference calls
and the circumstances under which they may choose to mask them. I investigate this issue
using textual analysis of conference call transcripts. I count words with a positive tone and
words with a negative tone used by analysts in the discussion portion of the conference
call. These counts are used to construct a measure of the amount of optimistic/pessimistic
language used by analysts. I examine whether optimistic language voiced by analysts is
informative to the market. I find a positive association between the optimistic language
used by analysts during the discussion phase of the conference call, and contemporaneous
stock returns. I infer that the optimistic language used by analysts is informative.
In subsequent tests, I examine whether analysts are less likely to express their true beliefs
when the firm announces bad news relative to when the firm announces good news, and
whether the optimistic language used by analysts is affected by institutional holdings in the
firm. Analyst optimism is potentially impacted by the incentive to preserve access to
management and to preserve the information advantage of their institutional clients.
My results indicate that the optimism reflected in the discussion portion of conference calls
is biased. I find that analysts are more likely to avoid expressing their true negative beliefs
about a firm during the conference call when the firm announces bad news. Further, if the
analyst’s true beliefs are pessimistic, the analyst is less likely to voice her true beliefs on
the conference call. Institutional investors likely prefer analysts not to reveal their true
beliefs during the conference call but rather to communicate their thoughts privately. My
results suggest that analysts add bias to the language used in conference calls to appease
their buy-side institutional clients, and to preserve the information advantage of their
institutional clients. Analysts have incentives to appease their buy-side clients, because
they are normally paid by their buy-side clients through soft dollar arrangements.
Collectively, the research presented in this dissertation provides evidence of the relevance
of earnings conference calls as a disclosure event. It further suggests that the dynamics of
conference calls affect the information production in capital markets, and the way in which
information flows to the market. The better understanding of why conference calls are
useful and how the dynamics of the call affect information production should be useful
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knowledge for regulators and standard setters. This knowledge may be considered in
developing new accounting standards for the disclosure of intangible assets and for
assessing the effectiveness of Regulation Fair Disclosure.
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Samenvatting
Conference calls die naar aanleiding van een kwartaalbericht worden gehouden, zijn de
laatste jaren steeds populairder geworden, maar er is weinig bewijs voor het incrementele
nut dat een conference call heeft boven het kwartaalbericht. In hoofdstuk 2 van dit
proefschrift wordt één potentiële factor die in additioneel nut kan resulteren onderzocht, de
mogelijkheid om gedurende het vraag-en-antwoord deel van de conference call nieuwe
informatie aan het management te ontlokken. Op basis van een steekproef van ongeveer
tienduizend transcripties van conference calls, onderzoek ik de relatie tussen het deel van
de conference call waarin het management een presentatie geeft en het discussiedeel van
de conference call. Ik vind dat de discussieperiode van de conference call langer wordt
naar mate het management in de presentatie abnormaal weinig toelichting geeft. Daarnaast
is de relatie tussen weinig toelichting in de presentatie en langere discussies sterker
naarmate meer analisten de onderneming volgen. Ook vind ik bewijs dat (in het algemeen)
langere calls meer informatief zijn voor de markt; langere calls zijn gerelateerd aan grotere
opvolgende aanpassingen in de voorspellingen van analisten en een verbetering in de
juistheid van de voorspellingen van analisten. Ten slotte onderzoek ik of bepaalde typen
toelichtingen in de presentatie, leiden tot kortere discussie. Ik vind dat meer financieel
getinte toelichtingen in de presentatie leiden tot een kortere discussie, terwijl meer
toekomstgerichte toelichtingen tot een langere discussie leiden. Bij elkaar genomen,
suggereren deze resultaten dat analisten tijdens de conference call een actieve rol spelen in
het onthullen van informatie, waardoor een rijkere informatieomgeving ontstaat dan anders
het geval zou zijn.
In hoofdstuk 3 van dit proefschrift wordt de relatie tussen toelichtingen over immateriële
activa in conference calls en gelijktijdige aandelenkoersreacties onderzocht. Op basis van
toelichtingen over immateriële activa in meer dan 8.000 conference calls, geef ik bewijs
dat aandelenmarkten reageren op toelichtingen over immateriële activa. Daarnaast vind ik
dat toelichtingen over immateriële activa “vasthoudend” zijn: zodra er informatie over
immateriële activa wordt verstrekt in het presentatiedeel, is het meer waarschijnlijk dat in
volgende presentaties van conference calls ook informatie over die categorie immateriële
activa wordt verstrekt. De enige uitzondering betreft externe immateriële activa; het is niet
meer waarschijnlijk dat managers informatie over externe immateriële activa gaan
verstrekken zodra ze dat al een keer hebben gedaan. Gezamenlijk met mijn bevinding dat
de koersreacties op informatie die over externe immateriële activa in het discussiedeel
worden verstrekt het minst geprononceerd zijn, suggereert dit resultaat dat managers
selectief zijn in de informatie die zij verschaffen over externe immateriële activa. Ten
slotte vind ik dat managers leren wat de informatiebehoefte van analisten is door middel
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van de vragen die analisten stellen gedurende het discussiedeel, dat wil zeggen: in de
volgende conference call is het meer waarschijnlijk dat managers vrijwillig informatie over
dezelfde categorie immateriële activa verstrekken. Gezamenlijk suggereren deze resultaten
dat toelichtingen over immateriële activa in een conference call informatief zijn, dat
managers hun toelichtingen aanpassen op de behoefte van analisten, maar dat managers
meer selectief zijn ten aanzien van de informatie over externe immateriële activa.
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik of analisten op conference calls hun echte mening uiten en de
omstandigheden waaronder ze hun echte mening mogelijk verhullen. Ik onderzoek dit door
middel van tekstuele analyse van transcripties van conference calls. Ik tel de door analisten
gebruikte woorden met een positieve toon en de woorden met een negatieve toon, in het
discussiedeel van de conference call. Deze tellingen worden gebruikt om een maatstaf voor
het optimistische/pessimistische taalgebruik van analisten te construeren. Ik onderzoek of
het optimistische taalgebruik van analisten informatief is voor de markt. Ik vind dat er een
positief verband bestaat tussen de optimistische taal die door analisten in de conference
call wordt gebruikt en de gelijktijdige aandelenkoersen. Ik leid daar uit af dat optimistisch
taalgebruik door analisten informatief is voor beleggers.
In aanvullende toetsen, onderzoek ik of het minder waarschijnlijk is dat analisten hun echte
mening op conference calls uiten wanneer de onderneming slecht nieuws aankondigt ten
opzichte van wanneer de onderneming goed nieuws aankondigt en of optimistisch
taalgebruik wordt beïnvloed door de belangen van institutionele beleggers in de
onderneming. Het optimisme van analisten wordt mogelijk beïnvloed door het belang dat
analisten hebben om toegang tot het management te hebben en het belang om de
informatievoorsprong die hun institutionele beleggers hebben te behouden.
Mijn resultaten tonen aan dat het optimisme in het discussiedeel van de conference call
vertekend is. Ik vind dat het meer waarschijnlijk is dat analisten vermijden om negatieve
meningen te uiten op de conference call, wanneer de onderneming slecht nieuws heeft
aangekondigd. Daarnaast vind ik dat, indien de analist in werkelijkheid pessimistisch is,
het minder waarschijnlijk is dat de analist dit pessimisme uit wanneer de belangen van
institutionele beleggers in de onderneming groter zijn. Institutionele beleggers hebben er
waarschijnlijk een voorkeur voor dat analisten het pessimisme niet uiten in de conference
call, maar in plaats daarvan hun mening niet-publiekelijk delen. Mijn resultaten suggereren
dat analisten hun taalgebruik aanpassen om hun institutionele klanten te behagen en om de
informatievoorsprong van hun institutionele klanten te behouden. Analisten hebben er
belang bij om hun institutionele klanten te behagen, omdat zij doorgaans worden betaald
door hun institutionele klanten door middel van zogenaamde “soft dollar” regelingen.
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Gezamenlijk geeft het onderzoek dat in dit proefschrift wordt gepresenteerd bewijs van de
relevantie van conference calls als een medium voor beleggersinformatie. Het suggereert
tevens dat de dynamiek van conference calls de informatieproductie door kapitaalmarkten
beïnvloedt en de manier waarop informatie naar de markt vloeit beïnvloedt. Dit betere
begrip van de redenen waarom conference calls relevant zijn en hoe zij
informatieproductie beïnvloeden kan nuttige kennis zijn voor toezichthouders en
regelgevers. Deze kennis kan overwogen worden bij het ontwikkelen van nieuwe regels
voor verslaggeving over immateriële activa en voor de beoordeling van de effectiviteit van
Regulation Fair Disclosure.
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l)THE ROLE OF ANALYST CONFERENCE CALLS IN CAPITAL MARKETS
Many firms conduct a conference call with analysts shortly after the quarterly earnings
announcement. In these calls, management discusses the completed quarter, and analysts
may ask questions. Due to SEC requirements, conference calls in the United States are
virtually always live webcasted. A growing number of investors listens in on conference
calls, suggesting that calls are useful for investor decision-making.
This research sheds more light on the role of conference calls in capital markets by
analysing a large sample of conference call transcripts, analyst forecasts, and
contemporaneous stock market reactions. The study investigates why conference calls are
useful. The analysis shows that managers who provide little information in their
presentation are actively probed by analysts. Hence, the interactivity of the call enriches
the information environment. In a second study, evidence is presented that information
about intangible assets is one of the items in conference calls that moves stock markets.
This study also shows that managers use the conference call to learn about the
information needs of analysts with respect to intangible assets. A third study suggests
that sell-side analysts do not voice their true beliefs on conference calls in an attempt to
favour their buy-side clients.
Collectively, these results provide evidence that conference calls with analysts enrich
the information environment, but their usefulness may be restricted by analyst incentives.
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